@su-record/vibe@4.2.22
Your personal FDE in Claude and Codex. Understand the work, use the right tools, deliver and retain useful context. One entry: vibe.
AI Security Review
scanned 1d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe postinstall hook is limited to global installs, but it automatically installs package-owned agent integrations without a confirmation step. This warrants a warning for agent extension lifecycle risk; the inspected source does not establish a concrete malicious attack.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The manifest defines a postinstall hook that runs scripts/postinstall.js.
- The hook proceeds only for global npm installs without the skip setting, then calls setupGlobal without a confirmation prompt.
- Global setup detects agent client homes and registers the package plugin or installs home-level surfaces.
- Plugin installation assembles a local tree of package-owned hooks and a skill, then registers it in the user’s marketplace.
- The generated plugin configures session, stop, and shell-tool hooks.
Source & flagged code
19 flagged · loading sourcePackage defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkgInstall-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.
package.jsonView on unpkgPackage source references child process execution.
mcpb/server/index.jsView on unpkg · L10Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @su-record/vibe@4.2.22.
See all versions of @su-record/vibe for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @su-record/vibe@4.2.22 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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