registry / @su-record/vibe / 4.2.6

@su-record/vibe@4.2.6

Your personal FDE in Claude and Codex. Understand the work, use the right tools, deliver and retain useful context. One entry: vibe.

AI Security Review

scanned 11d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

The postinstall behavior creates a guarded lifecycle risk because it sets up this package’s own agent surfaces in detected client homes. The inspected source does not establish unconsented modification of an unrelated control surface or another concrete attack, so this warrants a warning rather than a block.

Static reason

High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.; source matched previously finalized malicious package; routed for review

Trigger

Global npm installation when VIBE_SKIP_SETUP is unset.

Impact

Agent homes may gain this package’s instructions, skill, hook, or plugin registration.

Mechanism

The postinstall hook imports global setup, which installs package-owned agent surfaces for detected clients.

AI rationale

Evidence

package.jsonscripts/postinstall.jsdist/install/global.jsdist/install/plugin.jsdist/install/register.js

Decision evidence

public snapshot

AI called this Suspicious at 91.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with medium false-positive risk.

Evidence for warning

package.json defines a postinstall hook that runs scripts/postinstall.js.
The hook runs setup only for global installs, unless VIBE_SKIP_SETUP is set.
Global setup installs surfaces for each detected client home.
Those surfaces include the package card, skill, and hook; available client CLIs may register the package’s own plugin.
The plugin installer assembles the package tree and writes its marketplace entry.
The required register.js location reads the installed Claude plugin version.

Evidence against

The lifecycle setup is limited to global installs and has an explicit skip variable.
The setup registers this package’s own plugin and installs its own card, skill, and hook; no unrelated agent extension or credential transfer was identified.

Behavioral surface

Source

ChildProcessCryptoEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetworkShell

Supply chain

HighEntropyStrings

Source & flagged code

18 flagged

package.jsonView file

Lines 11-51json

11 "skills/",

12 "reviewers/",

13 "hooks/",

14 "scripts/",

15 ".claude-plugin/",

16 ".codex-plugin/",

17 "card.md",

18 "README.md",

19 "LICENSE",

20 "mcpb/",

21 "internal/"

22 ],

23 "engines": {

24 "node": ">=20.12.0"

25 },

26 "scripts": {

27 "build": "tsc -p tsconfig.json && chmod +x dist/cli.js",

28 "typecheck": "tsc --noEmit -p tsconfig.json",

29 "test": "vitest run",

30 "check": "npm run build && npm test",

31 "postinstall": "node scripts/postinstall.js"

High

Install Time Lifecycle Scripts

Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.

package.jsonView on unpkg · L31

Medium

Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script

Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.

package.jsonView on unpkg · L31

32 },

33 "dependencies": {

34 "ajv": "^8.17.1",

35 "yaml": "^2.8.1"

36 },

37 "devDependencies": {

38 "@types/node": "^22.19.10",

39 "tsx": "^4.23.5",

40 "typescript": "^5.9.3",

41 "vitest": "^4.1.10"

42 },

43 "license": "MIT",

44 "repository": "https://github.com/su-record/vibe",

45 "keywords": [

46 "harness",

47 "ax",

48 "fde",

49 "forward-deployed-engineer",

50 "verification",

51 "claude-code",

mcpb/server/index.jsView file

Lines 1-30javascript

1#!/usr/bin/env node

2/**

3 * vibe for the Claude desktop app — an MCP Bundle server that is nothing but a cable to the

4 * `vibe` CLI. Every tool runs `vibe <command> --json` in the project folder the user picked at

5 * install time (VIBE_PROJECT_DIR) and returns the JSON. The verdict stays in the CLI; this

6 * surface is for the interview, the approval, the judgement and the handoff — not for writing code.

7 *

8 * MCP over stdio is newline-delimited JSON-RPC 2.0. Three methods matter here: initialize,

9 * tools/list, tools/call. No SDK: the protocol subset is small and the bundle stays dependency-free.

dist/core/readerSession.jsView file

Lines 17-57javascript

17}

18export function findSession(key, home, now = Date.now()) {

19 const all = readJson(

dist/core/tree.jsView file

Lines 1-21javascript

1import { createHash } from 'node:crypto';

2import { spawnSync } from 'node:child_process';

3import fs from 'node:fs';

4import path from 'node:path';

dist/core/github.jsView file

Lines 1-21javascript

1import { spawnSync } from 'node:child_process';

2import { readJson } from './store.js';

3import { usage } from './errors.js';

4const API =

dist/install/global.jsView file

Lines 1-37javascript

1import fs from 'node:fs';

2import os from 'node:os';

3import path from 'node:path';

4import { packageRoot } from '../core/paths.js';

dist/install/plugin.jsView file

•Manifest-trigger-reachable source links an external AI-agent control path to a behavior-bearing write operation. names = ['vibe']; const hook_files = ['notify.js', 'session.js', 'private-store.cjs', 'session-files.cjs', 'session-state.cjs', 'session-context.cjs', 'session-repair.cjs', 'slice-command.cjs', 'slice-store.cjs', 'slice-guard.cjs']; export const marketplace_name = 'vibe-local'; export function pluginpaths(home = os.homedir()) { return { home, tree: path.join(home, '.config', 'vibe', 'plugin', 'vibe'), marketplace: path.join(home, '.agents', 'plugins', 'marketplace.json'), }; }

High

Trigger Reachable External Ai Agent Control Surface Mutation

Manifest-trigger-reachable source writes behavior-bearing configuration into a user or project AI-agent control surface.

dist/install/plugin.jsView on unpkg

dist/core/docs/pdf.js#virtual:normalized:round1View file

•stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_parse_error; limitedFiles = 2

High

Semantic Analysis Limited

A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review.

dist/core/docs/pdf.js#virtual:normalized:round1View on unpkg

dist/core/inspect.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @su-record/vibe@4.2.1 matchedPath = dist/core/inspect.js matchedIdentity = npm:QHN1LXJlY29yZC92aWJl:4.2.1 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High