@tapi-dev/sdk@0.3.2

### Read dropdown choices without recording a click

AI Security Review

scanned 25d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

The package is a user-invoked Tapi SDK and CLI with no registry install lifecycle and no hidden startup execution. Spawns, Firebase refresh, and workflow workers stay on documented local or caller-selected Tapi flows.

Static reason

High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.; source matched previously finalized malicious package; routed for review; previous stored version diff introduced dangerous source

Trigger

A person runs the tapi command or calls the SDK workflow and client APIs.

Impact

No unsolicited install mutation, credential theft, or remote payload execution was identified.

Mechanism

The library defines clients and CLI commands. Import does not register install hooks, start downloads, or send credentials.

AI rationale

Decision evidence

public snapshot

AI called this Clean at 86.0% confidence as Benign with low false-positive risk.

Evidence for AI clean decision

package.json has no preinstall, install, or postinstall hook; its scripts are build, test, prepack, and prepublishOnly.
Credential refresh posts the local Tapi refresh token only to Google's securetoken endpoint.
User-invoked dev commands spawn this package's CLI, a local npm dev server, or the workspace Python runner.
dist/cli.js runs its command dispatcher only when that file is the process entrypoint.
Workflow helpers spawn a local worker to inspect or run developer workflow source after an explicit call.

Evidence against

Explicit studio and service install commands download release artifacts and check a manifest sha256 before launch.
HttpClient attaches a caller-supplied bearer token to the caller-supplied API base URL.
Trigger sync can evaluate a local tapi.config.ts object with the Function constructor.

Behavioral surface

Source

ChildProcessCryptoDynamicRequireEnvironmentVarsEvalFilesystemNetwork

Source & flagged code

14 flagged

dist/auth.jsView file

6patternName = google_api_key severity = high line = 6

High

High Secret

Package contains a high-severity secret pattern.

dist/auth.jsView on unpkg · L6

6patternName = google_api_key severity = high line = 6

High

Secret Pattern

Google API key in dist/auth.js

dist/auth.jsView on unpkg · L6

dist/workflow-cli.jsView file

3import { resolve, join } from "node:path"; L4: import { spawn } from "node:child_process"; L5: import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url";

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

dist/workflow-cli.jsView on unpkg · L3

3Cross-file remote execution chain: dist/workflow-cli.js spawns dist/cli.js; helper contains network access plus dynamic code execution. L3: import { resolve, join } from "node:path"; L4: import { spawn } from "node:child_process"; L5: import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url"; ... L9: export function workspaceArguments(args) { L10: const root = resolve(option(args, "--workspace") || process.cwd()); L11: const workspace = loadWorkspace(root); ... L104: throw new Error("Choose an existing session with --session; dev does not open or reset a browser"); L105: const job = await client.workflows.run({ sessionId, versionId: version.version_id, inputs: JSON.parse(option(expanded, "--input") || "{}") }); L106: await serveWorkflowJobs(options, { jobId: job.job_id, once: true });

High

Cross File Remote Execution Context

Source spawns a local helper that also contains network and dynamic execution context; review data flow before blocking.

dist/workflow-cli.jsView on unpkg · L3

dist/cli.jsView file

•Manifest-reachable source captures an API credential, sends it to a fixed unofficial gateway, and persists that redirection in agent or shell configuration. dist/cli.js: import { mkdir, readFile, readdir, rename, rm, stat, statfs, unlink, writeFile } from "node:fs/promises"; import { emitKeypressEvents } from "node:readline"; raw.apiBaseUrl = requireOptionValue(args, ++index, arg); raw.apiBaseUrl = arg.slice("--api-base-url=".length); raw.apiBaseUrl = arg.slice("--server=".length); const apiBaseUrl = normalizeHttpUrl(raw.apiBaseUrl const downloadsBaseUrl = normalizeHttpUrl(envString("TAPI_DOWNLOADS_BASE_URL") ?? DEFAULT_DOWNLOADS_BASE_URL, "TAPI_DOWNLOADS_BASE_URL"); : `${downloadsBaseUrl.replace(/\/+$/, "")}/studio/channels/${channel}/latest.json`;

High

Credential Redirect Persistence

Manifest-reachable source sends a prompted API credential to a fixed unofficial gateway and persists the redirection.

dist/cli.jsView on unpkg

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @tapi-dev/sdk@0.2.6 matchedPath = dist/cli.js matchedIdentity = npm:QHRhcGktZGV2L3Nkaw:0.2.6 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/cli.jsView on unpkg

27patternName = google_api_key severity = high line = 27

High

Secret Pattern

Google API key in dist/cli.js

dist/cli.jsView on unpkg · L27

dist/studio-dev.jsView file

1import { spawn } from "node:child_process"; L2: import { createServer } from "node:net"; L3: import { existsSync, readFileSync } from "node:fs"; ... L22: const phases = [{ message: "SDK development launch requested" }]; L23: const workspaceRoot = findWorkspaceRoot(options.workspaceRoot || process.cwd()); L24: const uiRoot = join(workspaceRoot, "tapi_v3", "studio", "browser"); ... L39: const env = { L40: ...process.env, L41: TAPI_DEV_CONFIG: runner.context.configPath, ... L49: phases.push({ message: "Vite UI is ready", detail: `${DEV_HOST}:${uiPort}` }); L50: const launchTrace = Buffer.from(JSON.stringify({ phases }), "utf8").toString("base64url"); L51: const url = `http://${DEV_HOST}:${uiPort}/?tapp=${encodeURIComponent(tappId)}&tapiDevLaunch=${launchTrace}`;

Critical

Reverse Shell

Source matches reverse-shell style process and socket wiring.

dist/studio-dev.jsView on unpkg · L1

1Trigger-reachable chain: manifest.bin -> dist/cli.js -> dist/studio-dev.js L1: import { spawn } from "node:child_process"; L2: import { createServer } from "node:net"; L3: import { existsSync, readFileSync } from "node:fs"; ... L22: const phases = [{ message: "SDK development launch requested" }]; L23: const workspaceRoot = findWorkspaceRoot(options.workspaceRoot || process.cwd()); L24: const uiRoot = join(workspaceRoot, "tapi_v3", "studio", "browser"); ... L39: const env = { L40: ...process.env, L41: TAPI_DEV_CONFIG: runner.context.configPath, ... L49: phases.push({ message: "Vite UI is ready", detail: `${DEV_HOST}:${uiPort}` }); L50: const launchTrace = Buffer.from(JSON.stringify({ phases }), "utf8").toString("base64url"); L51: const url = `http://${DEV_HOST}:${uiPort}/?tapp=${encodeURIC

Critical

Trigger Reachable Dangerous Capability

A package entrypoint or install-time lifecycle script reaches a source file with blocking dangerous behavior.

dist/studio-dev.jsView on unpkg · L1

dist/workflow-source.js#virtual:normalized:round1View file

•stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_parse_error; limitedFiles = 1

High

Semantic Analysis Limited

A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review.

dist/workflow-source.js#virtual:normalized:round1View on unpkg

dist/runner-dev.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @tapi-dev/sdk@0.2.6 matchedPath = dist/runner-dev.js matchedIdentity = npm:QHRhcGktZGV2L3Nkaw:0.2.6 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/runner-dev.jsView on unpkg

dist/workflow-source.jsView file

•matchType = previous_version_dangerous_delta matchedPackage = @tapi-dev/sdk@0.3.0 matchedIdentity = npm:QHRhcGktZGV2L3Nkaw:0.3.0 similarity = 0.750 summary = stored previous version shares package body but lacks this dangerous source file

Critical

Previous Version Dangerous Delta

This package version adds a dangerous source file absent from the previous stored version; route for source-aware review.

dist/workflow-source.jsView on unpkg

Source & flagged code

14 flagged · loading source

dist/auth.jsView file

6patternName = google_api_key severity = high line = 6

High

High Secret

Package contains a high-severity secret pattern.

dist/auth.jsView on unpkg · L6

6patternName = google_api_key severity = high line = 6

High

Secret Pattern

Google API key in dist/auth.js

dist/auth.jsView on unpkg · L6

dist/workflow-cli.jsView file

3import { resolve, join } from "node:path"; L4: import { spawn } from "node:child_process"; L5: import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url";

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

dist/workflow-cli.jsView on unpkg · L3

Findings

3 Critical11 High4 Medium7 Low

CriticalReverse Shelldist/studio-dev.js

CriticalTrigger Reachable Dangerous Capabilitydist/studio-dev.js

CriticalPrevious Version Dangerous Deltadist/workflow-source.js

HighHigh Secretdist/auth.js

HighChild Processdist/workflow-cli.js

HighCredential Redirect Persistencedist/cli.js

HighSandbox Evasion Gated Capabilitydist/studio-dev.js

HighCross File Remote Execution Contextdist/workflow-cli.js

HighSemantic Analysis Limiteddist/workflow-source.js#virtual:normalized:round1

HighKnown Malware Source Similaritydist/cli.js

HighKnown Malware Source Similaritydist/studio-dev.js

Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to @tapi-dev/sdk@0.3.2.

See all versions of @tapi-dev/sdk for other recorded verdicts.

Review the evidence and your use of @tapi-dev/sdk@0.3.2 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.

Evidence last updated: 2026-09-27 23:51:41.213Z (UTC).

Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.