registry / Credential exfiltration / @tapi-dev/sdk
@tapi-dev/sdk
Official JavaScript and TypeScript client for TAPI developer APIs.
This report shows the evidence for @tapi-dev/sdk@0.2.6. 2 of 19 known versions are blocked or flagged. The newest version, 0.3.12, is flagged. See all versions.
AI Security Review
scanned 1mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe package contains no automatic npm install hook, but its user-invoked authentication flow deliberately delegates Google credential collection to an unrelated GitLab Pages domain. This is a concrete credential-exfiltration risk and warrants blocking publication.
Static reason
High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.; previous stored version diff introduced dangerous source
Trigger
A user runs the Tapi CLI login or Studio installation authentication flow.
Impact
The third-party page can capture a user's Google credentials or tokens, enabling account compromise.
Mechanism
Third-party browser credential collection followed by token exchange and local credential persistence.
Attack narrative
When the user starts the CLI authentication flow, the package opens a hard-coded GitLab Pages URL with a local callback port. The callback accepts Google ID and access tokens supplied by that externally hosted page. The package then exchanges those tokens for Firebase credentials and writes the refresh token to its local auth cache. Hosting the credential-collection page on an unrelated fixed third-party domain creates a concrete credential theft path.
AI rationale
The package contains no automatic npm install hook, but its user-invoked authentication flow deliberately delegates Google credential collection to an unrelated GitLab Pages domain. This is a concrete credential-exfiltration risk and warrants blocking publication.
Evidence
dist/cli.jsdist/auth.js
Network endpoints2
rsarlong-1f92fd.gitlab.io/auth.htmlidentitytoolkit.googleapis.com
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Malicious at 96.0% confidence as Malware with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for block
- The CLI hard-codes an unrelated GitLab Pages page as its Google sign-in page.
- That page is opened with a local callback port, and the callback accepts Google ID and access tokens.
- The CLI sends the received Google tokens to Firebase and saves the resulting refresh token locally.
- The command-line entry point executes this behavior when the CLI is invoked.
Evidence against
- The manifest has no install, postinstall, or preinstall hook.
- The workflow code execution path is explicitly for developer-supplied workflow source, not automatic package execution.
- Most other network calls implement the advertised Tapi SDK and CLI service operations.
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessCryptoDynamicRequireEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetworkShell
HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings
NoLicense
Source & flagged code
11 flagged · loading sourcedist/auth.jsView file
6patternName = google_api_key
severity = high
line = 6
High
6patternName = google_api_key
severity = high
line = 6
High
dist/workflow-cli.jsView file
3import { resolve, join } from "node:path";
L4: import { spawn } from "node:child_process";
L5: import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url";
High
Child Process
Package source references child process execution.
dist/workflow-cli.jsView on unpkg · L33Cross-file remote execution chain: dist/workflow-cli.js spawns dist/cli.js; helper contains network access plus dynamic code execution.
L3: import { resolve, join } from "node:path";
L4: import { spawn } from "node:child_process";
L5: import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url";
...
L9: export function workspaceArguments(args) {
L10: const root = resolve(option(args, "--workspace") || process.cwd());
L11: const workspace = loadWorkspace(root);
...
L104: throw new Error("Choose an existing session with --session; dev does not open or reset a browser");
L105: const job = await client.workflows.run({ sessionId, versionId: version.version_id, inputs: JSON.parse(option(expanded, "--input") || "{}") });
L106: await serveWorkflowJobs(options, { jobId: job.job_id, once: true });
High
Cross File Remote Execution Context
Source spawns a local helper that also contains network and dynamic execution context; review data flow before blocking.
dist/workflow-cli.jsView on unpkg · L3dist/studio-dev.jsView file
1import { spawn } from "node:child_process";
L2: import { createServer } from "node:net";
L3: import { existsSync, readFileSync } from "node:fs";
...
L22: const phases = [{ message: "SDK development launch requested" }];
L23: const workspaceRoot = findWorkspaceRoot(options.workspaceRoot || process.cwd());
L24: const uiRoot = join(workspaceRoot, "tapi_v3", "studio", "browser");
...
L39: const env = {
L40: ...process.env,
L41: TAPI_DEV_CONFIG: runner.context.configPath,
...
L49: phases.push({ message: "Vite UI is ready", detail: `${DEV_HOST}:${uiPort}` });
L50: const launchTrace = Buffer.from(JSON.stringify({ phases }), "utf8").toString("base64url");
L51: const url = `http://${DEV_HOST}:${uiPort}/?tapp=${encodeURIComponent(tappId)}&tapiDevLaunch=${launchTrace}`;
Critical
Reverse Shell
Source matches reverse-shell style process and socket wiring.
dist/studio-dev.jsView on unpkg · L11Trigger-reachable chain: manifest.bin -> dist/cli.js -> dist/studio-dev.js
L1: import { spawn } from "node:child_process";
L2: import { createServer } from "node:net";
L3: import { existsSync, readFileSync } from "node:fs";
...
L22: const phases = [{ message: "SDK development launch requested" }];
L23: const workspaceRoot = findWorkspaceRoot(options.workspaceRoot || process.cwd());
L24: const uiRoot = join(workspaceRoot, "tapi_v3", "studio", "browser");
...
L39: const env = {
L40: ...process.env,
L41: TAPI_DEV_CONFIG: runner.context.configPath,
...
L49: phases.push({ message: "Vite UI is ready", detail: `${DEV_HOST}:${uiPort}` });
L50: const launchTrace = Buffer.from(JSON.stringify({ phases }), "utf8").toString("base64url");
L51: const url = `http://${DEV_HOST}:${uiPort}/?tapp=${encodeURIC
Critical
Trigger Reachable Dangerous Capability
A package entrypoint or install-time lifecycle script reaches a source file with blocking dangerous behavior.
dist/studio-dev.jsView on unpkg · L1174if (process.platform === "win32") {
L175: return spawn(process.env.ComSpec || "cmd.exe", ["/d", "/s", "/c", `npm.cmd run dev -- --host ${DEV_HOST} --port ${port} --strictPort`], {
L176: cwd: uiRoot,
High
1import { spawn } from "node:child_process";
L2: import { createServer } from "node:net";
L3: import { existsSync, readFileSync } from "node:fs";
...
L22: const phases = [{ message: "SDK development launch requested" }];
L23: const workspaceRoot = findWorkspaceRoot(options.workspaceRoot || process.cwd());
L24: const uiRoot = join(workspaceRoot, "tapi_v3", "studio", "browser");
...
L39: const env = {
L40: ...process.env,
L41: TAPI_DEV_CONFIG: runner.context.configPath,
...
L49: phases.push({ message: "Vite UI is ready", detail: `${DEV_HOST}:${uiPort}` });
L50: const launchTrace = Buffer.from(JSON.stringify({ phases }), "utf8").toString("base64url");
L51: const url = `http://${DEV_HOST}:${uiPort}/?tapp=${encodeURIComponent(tappId)}&tapiDevLaunch=${launchTrace}`;
High
Sandbox Evasion Gated Capability
Source gates dangerous network, credential, or execution behavior behind CI, host, platform, time, or geo fingerprint checks.
dist/studio-dev.jsView on unpkg · L1dist/cli.jsView file
•matchType = previous_version_dangerous_delta
matchedPackage = @tapi-dev/sdk@0.1.45
matchedIdentity = npm:QHRhcGktZGV2L3Nkaw:0.1.45
similarity = 0.611
summary = stored previous version shares package body but lacks this dangerous source file
Critical
Previous Version Dangerous Delta
This package version adds a dangerous source file absent from the previous stored version; route for source-aware review.
dist/cli.jsView on unpkg•Manifest-reachable source captures an API credential, sends it to a fixed unofficial gateway, and persists that redirection in agent or shell configuration.
dist/cli.js:
import { mkdir, readFile, readdir, rename, rm, stat, statfs, unlink, writeFile } from "node:fs/promises";
import { emitKeypressEvents } from "node:readline";
raw.apiBaseUrl = requireOptionValue(args, ++index, arg);
raw.apiBaseUrl = arg.slice("--api-base-url=".length);
raw.apiBaseUrl = arg.slice("--server=".length);
const apiBaseUrl = normalizeHttpUrl(raw.apiBaseUrl
const downloadsBaseUrl = normalizeHttpUrl(envString("TAPI_DOWNLOADS_BASE_URL") ?? DEFAULT_DOWNLOADS_BASE_URL, "TAPI_DOWNLOADS_BASE_URL");
: `${downloadsBaseUrl.replace(/\/+$/, "")}/studio/channels/${channel}/latest.json`;
High
Credential Redirect Persistence
Manifest-reachable source sends a prompted API credential to a fixed unofficial gateway and persists the redirection.
dist/cli.jsView on unpkg27patternName = google_api_key
severity = high
line = 27
High
Findings
3 Critical8 High4 Medium6 Low
CriticalReverse Shelldist/studio-dev.js
CriticalTrigger Reachable Dangerous Capabilitydist/studio-dev.js
CriticalPrevious Version Dangerous Deltadist/cli.js
HighHigh Secretdist/auth.js
HighChild Processdist/workflow-cli.js
HighShelldist/studio-dev.js
HighCredential Redirect Persistencedist/cli.js
HighSandbox Evasion Gated Capabilitydist/studio-dev.js
HighCross File Remote Execution Contextdist/workflow-cli.js
HighSecret Patterndist/auth.js
HighSecret Patterndist/cli.js
MediumDynamic Require
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
LowNon Install Lifecycle Scripts
LowScripts Present
LowFilesystem
LowHigh Entropy Strings
LowUrl Strings
LowNo License
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @tapi-dev/sdk@0.2.6.
The versions list below shows the verdict for each recorded version.
- Avoid installing @tapi-dev/sdk@0.2.6. Remove it from direct dependencies and check your lockfile for transitive copies.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
- If this version ran, investigate the affected machine and build environment. Rotate credentials it could access and rebuild from a trusted environment.
Evidence last updated: .
Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.
Versions
19 known versions0.3.12latestSuspiciousCredential ExfiltrationWarnPublishedOct 1, 2026, 6:37 PM0.3.11SuspiciousCredential ExfiltrationWarnPublishedOct 1, 2026, 6:01 PM0.3.9SuspiciousCredential ExfiltrationWarnPublishedSep 30, 2026, 9:40 PM0.3.8SuspiciousCredential ExfiltrationWarnPublishedSep 30, 2026, 8:47 PM0.3.7SuspiciousCredential ExfiltrationWarnPublishedSep 30, 2026, 7:01 PM0.3.6SuspiciousCredential ExfiltrationWarnPublishedSep 30, 2026, 4:53 PM0.3.2Clean—AllowPublishedSep 23, 2026, 7:39 PM0.3.0SuspiciousRemote Code ExecutionWarnPublishedSep 17, 2026, 4:28 PM0.2.9Clean—AllowPublishedSep 15, 2026, 8:40 PM0.2.8SuspiciousRemote Code ExecutionWarnPublishedSep 15, 2026, 5:19 PM0.2.6shownMaliciousCredential ExfiltrationBlockPublishedSep 14, 2026, 11:00 PM0.1.46MaliciousCredential ExfiltrationBlockPublishedSep 3, 2026, 4:12 PM0.1.45SuspiciousRemote Code ExecutionWarnPublishedSep 2, 2026, 2:21 AM0.1.39Suspicious—WarnPublishedJul 12, 2026, 3:14 PM0.1.38Suspicious—WarnPublishedJul 12, 2026, 12:51 AM0.1.36Suspicious—WarnPublishedJul 12, 2026, 12:09 AM0.1.34Suspicious—WarnPublishedJul 4, 2026, 3:50 PM0.1.33Suspicious—WarnUnder ReviewJul 1, 2026, 1:33 PM0.1.31Suspicious—WarnPublishedJul 1, 2026, 4:26 AM