registry / Credential exfiltration / @tapi-dev/sdk

@tapi-dev/sdk

Official JavaScript and TypeScript client for TAPI developer APIs.

This report shows the evidence for @tapi-dev/sdk@0.2.6. 2 of 19 known versions are blocked or flagged. The newest version, 0.3.12, is flagged. See all versions.

AI Security Review

scanned 1mo ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

The package contains no automatic npm install hook, but its user-invoked authentication flow deliberately delegates Google credential collection to an unrelated GitLab Pages domain. This is a concrete credential-exfiltration risk and warrants blocking publication.

Static reason

High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.; previous stored version diff introduced dangerous source

Trigger

A user runs the Tapi CLI login or Studio installation authentication flow.

Impact

The third-party page can capture a user's Google credentials or tokens, enabling account compromise.

Mechanism

Third-party browser credential collection followed by token exchange and local credential persistence.

Attack narrative

When the user starts the CLI authentication flow, the package opens a hard-coded GitLab Pages URL with a local callback port. The callback accepts Google ID and access tokens supplied by that externally hosted page. The package then exchanges those tokens for Firebase credentials and writes the refresh token to its local auth cache. Hosting the credential-collection page on an unrelated fixed third-party domain creates a concrete credential theft path.

AI rationale

Evidence

dist/cli.jsdist/auth.js

Network endpoints2

rsarlong-1f92fd.gitlab.io/auth.htmlidentitytoolkit.googleapis.com

Decision evidence

public snapshot

AI called this Malicious at 96.0% confidence as Malware with low false-positive risk.

Evidence for block

The CLI hard-codes an unrelated GitLab Pages page as its Google sign-in page.
That page is opened with a local callback port, and the callback accepts Google ID and access tokens.
The CLI sends the received Google tokens to Firebase and saves the resulting refresh token locally.
The command-line entry point executes this behavior when the CLI is invoked.

Evidence against

The manifest has no install, postinstall, or preinstall hook.
The workflow code execution path is explicitly for developer-supplied workflow source, not automatic package execution.
Most other network calls implement the advertised Tapi SDK and CLI service operations.

Behavioral surface

Source

ChildProcessCryptoDynamicRequireEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetworkShell

Supply chain

HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings

Manifest

Source & flagged code

11 flagged

dist/auth.jsView file

6patternName = google_api_key severity = high line = 6

High

High Secret

Package contains a high-severity secret pattern.

dist/auth.jsView on unpkg · L6

6patternName = google_api_key severity = high line = 6

High

Secret Pattern

Google API key in dist/auth.js

dist/auth.jsView on unpkg · L6

dist/workflow-cli.jsView file

3import { resolve, join } from "node:path"; L4: import { spawn } from "node:child_process"; L5: import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url";

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

dist/workflow-cli.jsView on unpkg · L3

3Cross-file remote execution chain: dist/workflow-cli.js spawns dist/cli.js; helper contains network access plus dynamic code execution. L3: import { resolve, join } from "node:path"; L4: import { spawn } from "node:child_process"; L5: import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url"; ... L9: export function workspaceArguments(args) { L10: const root = resolve(option(args, "--workspace") || process.cwd()); L11: const workspace = loadWorkspace(root); ... L104: throw new Error("Choose an existing session with --session; dev does not open or reset a browser"); L105: const job = await client.workflows.run({ sessionId, versionId: version.version_id, inputs: JSON.parse(option(expanded, "--input") || "{}") }); L106: await serveWorkflowJobs(options, { jobId: job.job_id, once: true });

High

Cross File Remote Execution Context

Source spawns a local helper that also contains network and dynamic execution context; review data flow before blocking.

dist/workflow-cli.jsView on unpkg · L3

dist/studio-dev.jsView file

1import { spawn } from "node:child_process"; L2: import { createServer } from "node:net"; L3: import { existsSync, readFileSync } from "node:fs"; ... L22: const phases = [{ message: "SDK development launch requested" }]; L23: const workspaceRoot = findWorkspaceRoot(options.workspaceRoot || process.cwd()); L24: const uiRoot = join(workspaceRoot, "tapi_v3", "studio", "browser"); ... L39: const env = { L40: ...process.env, L41: TAPI_DEV_CONFIG: runner.context.configPath, ... L49: phases.push({ message: "Vite UI is ready", detail: `${DEV_HOST}:${uiPort}` }); L50: const launchTrace = Buffer.from(JSON.stringify({ phases }), "utf8").toString("base64url"); L51: const url = `http://${DEV_HOST}:${uiPort}/?tapp=${encodeURIComponent(tappId)}&tapiDevLaunch=${launchTrace}`;

Critical

Reverse Shell

Source matches reverse-shell style process and socket wiring.

dist/studio-dev.jsView on unpkg · L1

1Trigger-reachable chain: manifest.bin -> dist/cli.js -> dist/studio-dev.js L1: import { spawn } from "node:child_process"; L2: import { createServer } from "node:net"; L3: import { existsSync, readFileSync } from "node:fs"; ... L22: const phases = [{ message: "SDK development launch requested" }]; L23: const workspaceRoot = findWorkspaceRoot(options.workspaceRoot || process.cwd()); L24: const uiRoot = join(workspaceRoot, "tapi_v3", "studio", "browser"); ... L39: const env = { L40: ...process.env, L41: TAPI_DEV_CONFIG: runner.context.configPath, ... L49: phases.push({ message: "Vite UI is ready", detail: `${DEV_HOST}:${uiPort}` }); L50: const launchTrace = Buffer.from(JSON.stringify({ phases }), "utf8").toString("base64url"); L51: const url = `http://${DEV_HOST}:${uiPort}/?tapp=${encodeURIC

Critical

Trigger Reachable Dangerous Capability

A package entrypoint or install-time lifecycle script reaches a source file with blocking dangerous behavior.

dist/studio-dev.jsView on unpkg · L1

dist/cli.jsView file

•matchType = previous_version_dangerous_delta matchedPackage = @tapi-dev/sdk@0.1.45 matchedIdentity = npm:QHRhcGktZGV2L3Nkaw:0.1.45 similarity = 0.611 summary = stored previous version shares package body but lacks this dangerous source file

Critical

Previous Version Dangerous Delta

This package version adds a dangerous source file absent from the previous stored version; route for source-aware review.

dist/cli.jsView on unpkg

•Manifest-reachable source captures an API credential, sends it to a fixed unofficial gateway, and persists that redirection in agent or shell configuration. dist/cli.js: import { mkdir, readFile, readdir, rename, rm, stat, statfs, unlink, writeFile } from "node:fs/promises"; import { emitKeypressEvents } from "node:readline"; raw.apiBaseUrl = requireOptionValue(args, ++index, arg); raw.apiBaseUrl = arg.slice("--api-base-url=".length); raw.apiBaseUrl = arg.slice("--server=".length); const apiBaseUrl = normalizeHttpUrl(raw.apiBaseUrl const downloadsBaseUrl = normalizeHttpUrl(envString("TAPI_DOWNLOADS_BASE_URL") ?? DEFAULT_DOWNLOADS_BASE_URL, "TAPI_DOWNLOADS_BASE_URL"); : `${downloadsBaseUrl.replace(/\/+$/, "")}/studio/channels/${channel}/latest.json`;

High

Credential Redirect Persistence

Manifest-reachable source sends a prompted API credential to a fixed unofficial gateway and persists the redirection.

dist/cli.jsView on unpkg

27patternName = google_api_key severity = high line = 27

High

Secret Pattern

Google API key in dist/cli.js

dist/cli.jsView on unpkg · L27

Source & flagged code

11 flagged · loading source

dist/auth.jsView file

6patternName = google_api_key severity = high line = 6

High

High Secret

Package contains a high-severity secret pattern.

dist/auth.jsView on unpkg · L6

6patternName = google_api_key severity = high line = 6

High

Secret Pattern

Google API key in dist/auth.js

dist/auth.jsView on unpkg · L6

dist/workflow-cli.jsView file

3import { resolve, join } from "node:path"; L4: import { spawn } from "node:child_process"; L5: import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url";

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

dist/workflow-cli.jsView on unpkg · L3

Findings

3 Critical8 High4 Medium6 Low

CriticalReverse Shelldist/studio-dev.js

CriticalTrigger Reachable Dangerous Capabilitydist/studio-dev.js

CriticalPrevious Version Dangerous Deltadist/cli.js

HighHigh Secretdist/auth.js

HighChild Processdist/workflow-cli.js

HighShelldist/studio-dev.js

HighCredential Redirect Persistencedist/cli.js

HighSandbox Evasion Gated Capabilitydist/studio-dev.js

HighCross File Remote Execution Contextdist/workflow-cli.js

HighSecret Patterndist/auth.js

HighSecret Patterndist/cli.js

MediumDynamic Require

Medium

Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to @tapi-dev/sdk@0.2.6.

The versions list below shows the verdict for each recorded version.

Avoid installing @tapi-dev/sdk@0.2.6. Remove it from direct dependencies and check your lockfile for transitive copies.
Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
If this version ran, investigate the affected machine and build environment. Rotate credentials it could access and rebuild from a trusted environment.

Evidence last updated: 2026-09-15 03:34:09.878Z (UTC).

Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.

Versions

19 known versions

0.3.12latestSuspiciousCredential ExfiltrationWarnPublishedOct 1, 2026, 6:37 PM 0.3.11SuspiciousCredential ExfiltrationWarnPublishedOct 1, 2026, 6:01 PM 0.3.9SuspiciousCredential ExfiltrationWarnPublishedSep 30, 2026, 9:40 PM 0.3.8SuspiciousCredential ExfiltrationWarnPublishedSep 30, 2026, 8:47 PM

AI Security Review

Decision evidence

Source & flagged code

Source & flagged code

Findings

Affected versions and remediation

Versions

Related packages

Other credential exfiltration packages

Related packages

Other credential exfiltration packages

Source & flagged code