registry / Credential exfiltration / @tapi-dev/sdk / 0.3.7

@tapi-dev/sdk@0.3.7

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AI Security Review

scanned 22d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

Source confirms forwarding of an existing service token to an unrestricted operator-configured destination. The explicit development command and absence of concrete covert attack behavior warrant a warning rather than publication blocking.

Static reason

High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.; source matched previously finalized malicious package; routed for review; previous stored version diff introduced dangerous source

Trigger

The user invokes tapi runner dev with a custom --server destination in a suitable source workspace.

Impact

A custom server can receive a Tapi session token intended for the service.

Mechanism

The CLI obtains cached Tapi credentials, accepts the server without a destination allowlist, and sends the ID token in the enrollment request's Authorization header.

AI rationale

Evidence

dist/auth.jsdist/cli.jsdist/runner-dev.jsdist/dev-context.jsauth.json

Network endpoints1

determined-motivation-production.up.railway.app

Decision evidence

public snapshot

AI called this Suspicious at 97.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with medium false-positive risk.

Evidence for warning

The authentication module reads an existing Tapi ID token from its credential cache and returns it when fresh.
The CLI loads cached Tapi credentials when the user invokes runner dev.
Runner development accepts an unrestricted --server argument, and development context uses it as the API destination.
Runner enrollment sends the cached ID token as a Bearer credential to that destination.
package.json has no automatic installation lifecycle hook.

Evidence against

The credential transfer requires an explicit development command and a suitable source workspace.
The default destination is the Tapi API; no hidden unrelated recipient or malware intent was established.

Behavioral surface

Source

ChildProcessCryptoDynamicRequireEnvironmentVarsEvalFilesystemNetworkWebSocket

Supply chain

HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings

Source & flagged code

14 flagged

dist/auth.jsView file

Lines 1-26javascript

1import { randomUUID } from "node:crypto";

2import { existsSync, readFileSync } from "node:fs";

3import { mkdir, rename, rm, writeFile } from "node:fs/promises";

4import { homedir } from "node:os";

5import { dirname, join } from "node:path";

6const DEFAULT_FIREBASE_API_KEY = "AIzaSyCDZR8lWyVQcWYfFdNZa4vuL4IWEC0h6gE";

High

High Secret

Package contains a high-severity secret pattern.

dist/auth.jsView on unpkg · L6

High

Secret Pattern

Google API key in dist/auth.js

dist/auth.jsView on unpkg · L6

7const DEFAULT_EXPIRY_SKEW_MS = 60_000;

8export function getTapiDataDir() {

9 if (process.platform === "win32") {

10 return join(process.env.LOCALAPPDATA || join(process.env.USERPROFILE || homedir(), "AppData", "Local"), "Tapi");

11 }

12 return join(process.env.XDG_DATA_HOME || join(homedir(), ".local", "share"), "tapi");

13}

14export function getTapiAuthCachePath(options = {}) {

15 return options.cachePath || join(getTapiDataDir(), "auth.json");

16}

17export function readTapiCredentials(options = {}) {

18 const path = getTapiAuthCachePath(options);

19 if (!existsSync(path))

20 return null;

21 try {

22 const value = JSON.parse(readFileSync(path, "utf8"));

23 const credentials = {

24 uid: String(value.uid || "").trim(),

25 idToken: String(value.id_token || "").trim(),

26 refreshToken: String(value.refresh_token || "").trim(),

dist/workflow-cli.jsView file

3import { resolve, join } from "node:path"; L4: import { spawn } from "node:child_process"; L5: import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url";

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

dist/workflow-cli.jsView on unpkg · L3

3Cross-file remote execution chain: dist/workflow-cli.js spawns dist/cli.js; helper contains network access plus dynamic code execution. L3: import { resolve, join } from "node:path"; L4: import { spawn } from "node:child_process"; L5: import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url"; ... L9: export function workspaceArguments(args) { L10: const root = resolve(option(args, "--workspace") || process.cwd()); L11: const workspace = loadWorkspace(root); ... L111: throw new Error("Choose an existing session with --session; dev does not open or reset a browser"); L112: const job = await client.workflows.run({ sessionId, versionId: version.version_id, inputs: JSON.parse(option(expanded, "--input") || "{}") }); L113: await serveWorkflowJobs(options, { jobId: job.job_id, once: true });

High

Cross File Remote Execution Context

Source spawns a local helper that also contains network and dynamic execution context; review data flow before blocking.

dist/workflow-cli.jsView on unpkg · L3

dist/cli.jsView file

•Manifest-reachable source captures an API credential, sends it to a fixed unofficial gateway, and persists that redirection in agent or shell configuration. dist/cli.js: import { mkdir, readFile, readdir, rename, rm, stat, statfs, unlink, writeFile } from "node:fs/promises"; import { emitKeypressEvents } from "node:readline"; raw.apiBaseUrl = requireOptionValue(args, ++index, arg); raw.apiBaseUrl = arg.slice("--api-base-url=".length); raw.apiBaseUrl = arg.slice("--server=".length); const apiBaseUrl = normalizeHttpUrl(raw.apiBaseUrl const downloadsBaseUrl = normalizeHttpUrl(envString("TAPI_DOWNLOADS_BASE_URL") ?? DEFAULT_DOWNLOADS_BASE_URL, "TAPI_DOWNLOADS_BASE_URL"); : `${downloadsBaseUrl.replace(/\/+$/, "")}/studio/channels/${channel}/latest.json`;

High

Credential Redirect Persistence

Manifest-reachable source sends a prompted API credential to a fixed unofficial gateway and persists the redirection.

dist/cli.jsView on unpkg

•matchType = token_shingles matchedPackage = @tapi-dev/sdk@0.2.6 matchedPath = dist/cli.js matchedIdentity = npm:QHRhcGktZGV2L3Nkaw:0.2.6 similarity = 1.000 shingleOverlap = 48 summary = source token shingles overlapped finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/cli.jsView on unpkg

27patternName = google_api_key severity = high line = 27

High

Secret Pattern

Google API key in dist/cli.js

dist/cli.jsView on unpkg · L27

dist/studio-dev.jsView file

1import { spawn } from "node:child_process"; L2: import { createServer } from "node:net"; L3: import { existsSync, readFileSync } from "node:fs"; ... L22: const phases = [{ message: "SDK development launch requested" }]; L23: const workspaceRoot = findWorkspaceRoot(options.workspaceRoot || process.cwd()); L24: const uiRoot = join(workspaceRoot, "tapi_v3", "studio", "browser"); ... L39: const env = { L40: ...process.env, L41: TAPI_DEV_CONFIG: runner.context.configPath, ... L49: phases.push({ message: "Vite UI is ready", detail: `${DEV_HOST}:${uiPort}` }); L50: const launchTrace = Buffer.from(JSON.stringify({ phases }), "utf8").toString("base64url"); L51: const url = `http://${DEV_HOST}:${uiPort}/?tapp=${encodeURIComponent(tappId)}&tapiDevLaunch=${launchTrace}`;

Critical

Reverse Shell

Source matches reverse-shell style process and socket wiring.

dist/studio-dev.jsView on unpkg · L1

1Trigger-reachable chain: manifest.bin -> dist/cli.js -> dist/studio-dev.js L1: import { spawn } from "node:child_process"; L2: import { createServer } from "node:net"; L3: import { existsSync, readFileSync } from "node:fs"; ... L22: const phases = [{ message: "SDK development launch requested" }]; L23: const workspaceRoot = findWorkspaceRoot(options.workspaceRoot || process.cwd()); L24: const uiRoot = join(workspaceRoot, "tapi_v3", "studio", "browser"); ... L39: const env = { L40: ...process.env, L41: TAPI_DEV_CONFIG: runner.context.configPath, ... L49: phases.push({ message: "Vite UI is ready", detail: `${DEV_HOST}:${uiPort}` }); L50: const launchTrace = Buffer.from(JSON.stringify({ phases }), "utf8").toString("base64url"); L51: const url = `http://${DEV_HOST}:${uiPort}/?tapp=${encodeURIC

Critical

Trigger Reachable Dangerous Capability

A package entrypoint or install-time lifecycle script reaches a source file with blocking dangerous behavior.

dist/studio-dev.jsView on unpkg · L1

dist/workflow-source.js#virtual:normalized:round1View file

•stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_parse_error; limitedFiles = 1

High

Semantic Analysis Limited

A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review.

dist/workflow-source.js#virtual:normalized:round1View on unpkg

dist/runner-dev.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @tapi-dev/sdk@0.2.6 matchedPath = dist/runner-dev.js matchedIdentity = npm:QHRhcGktZGV2L3Nkaw:0.2.6 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/runner-dev.jsView on unpkg

dist/workflow-source.jsView file

•matchType = previous_version_dangerous_delta matchedPackage = @tapi-dev/sdk@0.3.6 matchedIdentity = npm:QHRhcGktZGV2L3Nkaw:0.3.6 similarity = 0.932 summary = stored previous version shares package body but lacks this dangerous source file

Critical

Previous Version Dangerous Delta

This package version adds a dangerous source file absent from the previous stored version; route for source-aware review.

dist/workflow-source.jsView on unpkg

Source & flagged code

14 flagged · loading source

dist/auth.jsView file

6patternName = google_api_key severity = high line = 6

High

High Secret

Package contains a high-severity secret pattern.

dist/auth.jsView on unpkg · L6

6patternName = google_api_key severity = high line = 6

High

Secret Pattern

Google API key in dist/auth.js

dist/auth.jsView on unpkg · L6

dist/workflow-cli.jsView file

3import { resolve, join } from "node:path"; L4: import { spawn } from "node:child_process"; L5: import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url";

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

dist/workflow-cli.jsView on unpkg · L3

Findings

3 Critical11 High4 Medium7 Low

CriticalReverse Shelldist/studio-dev.js

CriticalTrigger Reachable Dangerous Capabilitydist/studio-dev.js

CriticalPrevious Version Dangerous Deltadist/workflow-source.js

HighHigh Secretdist/auth.js

HighChild Processdist/workflow-cli.js

HighCredential Redirect Persistencedist/cli.js

HighSandbox Evasion Gated Capabilitydist/studio-dev.js

HighCross File Remote Execution Contextdist/workflow-cli.js

HighSemantic Analysis Limiteddist/workflow-source.js#virtual:normalized:round1

HighKnown Malware Source Similaritydist/cli.js

HighKnown Malware Source Similaritydist/studio-dev.js

Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to @tapi-dev/sdk@0.3.7.

See all versions of @tapi-dev/sdk for other recorded verdicts.

Review the evidence and your use of @tapi-dev/sdk@0.3.7 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.

Evidence last updated: 2026-09-30 19:24:00.282Z (UTC).

Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.