registry / Credential exfiltration / @tapi-dev/sdk / 0.3.8

@tapi-dev/sdk@0.3.8

## Application runs own their cleanup

AI Security Review

scanned 22d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

Static source inspection establishes conditional forwarding of an existing service credential to an unrestricted configured endpoint. This warrants a warning under the credential-forwarding policy, without evidence sufficient to classify the package as malware.

Static reason

High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.; source matched previously finalized malicious package; routed for review; previous stored version diff introduced dangerous source

Trigger

Invoke tapi runner dev in a valid source workspace with a server override or workspace-configured API destination.

Impact

An unrelated configured server could receive the Tapi bearer token and potentially use its permissions.

Mechanism

The CLI loads cached Tapi credentials and sends the ID token in an enrollment request without restricting the server destination.

AI rationale

Evidence

dist/auth.jsdist/cli.jsdist/runner-dev.jsdist/dev-context.jsdist/workflow-cli.js

Network endpoints1

determined-motivation-production.up.railway.app

Decision evidence

public snapshot

AI called this Suspicious at 97.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with medium false-positive risk.

Evidence for warning

package.json has no automatic npm installation hooks or runtime self-dependency.
dist/auth.js reads an existing Tapi ID token from the credential cache.
dist/cli.js loads cached credentials when the user invokes runner dev.
dist/runner-dev.js sends the ID token as bearer authentication to the selected server.
dist/dev-context.js accepts the configured server without a destination allowlist; dist/runner-dev.js accepts --server.
dist/workflow-cli.js also obtains the server from workspace configuration.

Evidence against

The default destination is the Tapi service, and activation requires a user command.
No hidden credential recipient or concrete malware intent was established.

Behavioral surface

Source

ChildProcessCryptoDynamicRequireEnvironmentVarsEvalFilesystemNetworkWebSocket

Supply chain

HighEntropyStrings

Source & flagged code

14 flagged

dist/auth.jsView file

Lines 1-26javascript

1import { randomUUID } from "node:crypto";

2import { existsSync, readFileSync } from "node:fs";

3import { mkdir, rename, rm, writeFile } from "node:fs/promises";

4import { homedir } from "node:os";

5import { dirname, join } from "node:path";

6const DEFAULT_FIREBASE_API_KEY = "AIzaSyCDZR8lWyVQcWYfFdNZa4vuL4IWEC0h6gE";

High

High Secret

Package contains a high-severity secret pattern.

dist/auth.jsView on unpkg · L6

High

Secret Pattern

Google API key in dist/auth.js

dist/auth.jsView on unpkg · L6

7const DEFAULT_EXPIRY_SKEW_MS = 60_000;

8export function getTapiDataDir() {

9 if (process.platform === "win32") {

10 return join(process.env.LOCALAPPDATA || join(process.env.USERPROFILE || homedir(), "AppData", "Local"), "Tapi");

11 }

12 return join(process.env.XDG_DATA_HOME || join(homedir(), ".local", "share"), "tapi");

13}

14export function getTapiAuthCachePath(options = {}) {

15 return options.cachePath || join(getTapiDataDir(), "auth.json");

16}

17export function readTapiCredentials(options = {}) {

18 const path = getTapiAuthCachePath(options);

19 if (!existsSync(path))

20 return null;

21 try {

22 const value = JSON.parse(readFileSync(path, "utf8"));

23 const credentials = {

24 uid: String(value.uid || "").trim(),

25 idToken: String(value.id_token || "").trim(),

26 refreshToken: String(value.refresh_token || "").trim(),

dist/workflow-cli.jsView file

Lines 1-23javascript

1import { mkdir, writeFile } from "node:fs/promises";

2import { loadWorkspace } from "./workspace.js";

3import { resolve, join } from "node:path";

4import { spawn } from "node:child_process";

dist/cli.jsView file

Lines 7-47javascript

7import { mkdir, readFile, readdir, rename, rm, stat, statfs, unlink, writeFile } from "node:fs/promises";

8import { homedir } from "node:os";

9import { basename, dirname, join, resolve } from "node:path";

10import { performance } from "node:perf_hooks";

dist/studio-dev.jsView file

Lines 1-21javascript

1import { spawn } from "node:child_process";

2import { createServer } from "node:net";

3import { existsSync, readFileSync } from "node:fs";

Critical

Reverse Shell

Source matches reverse-shell style process and socket wiring.

dist/studio-dev.jsView on unpkg · L1

Critical

dist/workflow-source.js#virtual:normalized:round1View file

•stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_parse_error; limitedFiles = 1

High

Semantic Analysis Limited

A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review.

dist/workflow-source.js#virtual:normalized:round1View on unpkg

dist/runner-dev.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @tapi-dev/sdk@0.2.6 matchedPath = dist/runner-dev.js matchedIdentity = npm:QHRhcGktZGV2L3Nkaw:0.2.6 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/runner-dev.jsView on unpkg

dist/workflow-source.jsView file

•matchType = previous_version_dangerous_delta matchedPackage = @tapi-dev/sdk@0.3.7 matchedIdentity = npm:QHRhcGktZGV2L3Nkaw:0.3.7 similarity = 0.911 summary = stored previous version shares package body but lacks this dangerous source file

Critical

Previous Version Dangerous Delta

This package version adds a dangerous source file absent from the previous stored version; route for source-aware review.

dist/workflow-source.jsView on unpkg

Source & flagged code

14 flagged · loading source

dist/auth.jsView file

6patternName = google_api_key severity = high line = 6

High

High Secret

Package contains a high-severity secret pattern.

dist/auth.jsView on unpkg · L6

6patternName = google_api_key severity = high line = 6

High

Secret Pattern

Google API key in dist/auth.js

dist/auth.jsView on unpkg · L6

dist/workflow-cli.jsView file

3import { resolve, join } from "node:path"; L4: import { spawn } from "node:child_process"; L5: import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url";

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

dist/workflow-cli.jsView on unpkg · L3

Findings

3 Critical11 High4 Medium7 Low

CriticalReverse Shelldist/studio-dev.js

CriticalTrigger Reachable Dangerous Capabilitydist/studio-dev.js

CriticalPrevious Version Dangerous Deltadist/workflow-source.js

HighHigh Secretdist/auth.js

HighChild Processdist/workflow-cli.js

HighCredential Redirect Persistencedist/cli.js

HighSandbox Evasion Gated Capabilitydist/studio-dev.js

HighCross File Remote Execution Contextdist/workflow-cli.js

HighSemantic Analysis Limiteddist/workflow-source.js#virtual:normalized:round1

HighKnown Malware Source Similaritydist/cli.js

HighKnown Malware Source Similaritydist/studio-dev.js

Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to @tapi-dev/sdk@0.3.8.

See all versions of @tapi-dev/sdk for other recorded verdicts.

Review the evidence and your use of @tapi-dev/sdk@0.3.8 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.

Evidence last updated: 2026-09-30 20:52:23.319Z (UTC).

Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.