@theronap/agnoclast-mcp@0.9.276
Connect your AI assistant to Cortex — your org's projects, activity, gaps, and directives, scoped to you.
AI Security Review
scanned 6d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe server automatically reads a Codex ID token and sends it to Agnoclast during startup when the account has a confidential seat. The token belongs to the separate OpenAI service, and this transfer occurs without a distinct user request to open a confidential brain.
Static reason
No blocking static signals were detected.; previous stored version diff introduced dangerous source
Trigger
Starting the MCP server while signed into Codex with a confidential seat.
Impact
A foreign service receives an account token from the user’s local Codex credentials without a separate request to open a confidential brain.
Mechanism
The server checks for confidential seats, reads the Codex id_token, and POSTs it as proof to Agnoclast.
Attack narrative
When the MCP server starts, it first checks whether the user has confidential seats. If one exists, the Codex path reads the OpenAI-signed id_token from ~/.codex/auth.json and sends it in a proof object to https://agnoclast.com. This transmits a credential from the OpenAI account service to the package vendor automatically, before the user requests a confidential brain.
AI rationale
The server automatically reads a Codex ID token and sends it to Agnoclast during startup when the account has a confidential seat. The token belongs to the separate OpenAI service, and this transfer occurs without a distinct user request to open a confidential brain.
Evidence
lib/server.mjslib/confidential_session.mjslib/diagnose.mjs~/.codex/auth.json
Network endpoints1
agnoclast.com/api/brains/confidential/mine
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Malicious at 92.0% confidence as Malware with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for block
- On MCP server startup, the package checks for confidential seats and automatically gathers and submits AI account proof when a seat exists.
- For Codex, it reads the signed-in account’s id_token from ~/.codex/auth.json and places it in that proof.
- The proof is sent in a POST request to Agnoclast’s confidential-account endpoint.
- The default service host is https://agnoclast.com, separate from the OpenAI service that issued the ID token.
Evidence against
- The credential flow is conditional on the account having a confidential seat; it does not run for users with no such seat.
- The manifest declares no install, preinstall, or postinstall lifecycle hook.
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessCryptoEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetwork
HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings
Source & flagged code
6 flaggedlib/capture.mjsView file
1import { readFileSync, accessSync, constants, openSync, mkdirSync } from 'fs'
L2: import { spawn, execFileSync } from 'child_process'
L3: import { homedir } from 'os'
...
L21: if (!res.ok) return null
L22: const j = await res.json().catch(() => ({}))
L23: return Array.isArray(j.types) ? j.types : null
...
L35: try {
L36: if (resolve(String(cwd)) === homedir()) return 'general'
L37: } catch { /* unresolvable path — fall through to basename */ }
...
L45: //
L46: // Handles the four remote forms git emits: scp-like ssh (git@github.com:o/n.git), ssh://, https://,
L47: // git://. The HOST CHECK IS LOAD-BEARING, not cosmetic: this string becomes a clearance key, and
Low
Weak Crypto
Package source references weak cryptographic algorithms.
lib/capture.mjsView on unpkg · L1lib/editors/antigravity.mjsView file
4Trigger-reachable persistence chain: manifest.bin -> bin/cortex-mcp.mjs -> lib/install.mjs -> lib/editors/index.mjs -> lib/editors/antigravity.mjs
L4: // WatchPaths the trajectory store and runs a one-shot sync. wire() generates the two artifacts
L5: // (the sync.sh + the launchd plist) deterministically. It does NOT run `launchctl load` here
L6: // (an unverifiable system mutation) and it flags the PORTABILITY BLOCKER below.
...
L21: /** The launchd plist, home-substituted. Deterministic — golden-testable byte-for-byte. */
L22: export function renderAntigravityPlist({ home = homedir() } = {}) {
L23: const sh = join(home, '.cortex', 'antigravity-sync.sh')
...
L33: <array>
L34: <string>/bin/bash</string>
L35: <string>${sh}</string>
Findings
4 High3 Medium5 Low
HighTrigger Reachable External Ai Agent Control Surface Mutationlib/channel.mjs
HighTrigger Reachable Persistencelib/editors/antigravity.mjs
HighSemantic Analysis Limitedbin/cortex-mcp.mjs#virtual:normalized:round1
HighPrevious Version Dangerous Deltalib/confidential_session.mjs
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
MediumInstall Persistencelib/editors/antigravity.mjs
LowScripts Present
LowWeak Cryptolib/capture.mjs
LowFilesystem
LowHigh Entropy Strings
LowUrl Strings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @theronap/agnoclast-mcp@0.9.276.
See all versions of @theronap/agnoclast-mcp for other recorded verdicts.
- Avoid installing @theronap/agnoclast-mcp@0.9.276. Remove it from direct dependencies and check your lockfile for transitive copies.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
- If this version ran, investigate the affected machine and build environment. Rotate credentials it could access and rebuild from a trusted environment.
Evidence last updated: .
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