registry / Credential exfiltration / aims-workstation
aims-workstation
AIMS 工作站：本地智能体工作站——ARM 助手本地化（下载/离线/升级）、工作台对话式定制、多工作区隔离、分级自主与审计
This report shows the evidence for aims-workstation@0.1.27. 3 of 24 known versions are blocked or flagged. The newest version, 0.1.29, is flagged. See all versions.
AI Security Review
scanned 6d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe package routes configured LLM credentials to a fixed vendor gateway over plaintext HTTP by default, with TLS verification disabled. This creates a concrete credential disclosure risk when users configure their key without also replacing the default endpoint.
Static reason
High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.; previous stored version diff introduced dangerous source
Trigger
A model request or settings-page connectivity probe when an API key is configured and no replacement endpoint is set.
Impact
The gateway receives the user's LLM credential, and plaintext transport exposes it to network observers.
Mechanism
The server defaults to bifrost.infra.dev.aimstek.cn over HTTP and configures the LLM provider to use the configured or environment API key; TLS verification is disabled.
Attack narrative
When a configured LLM key is used without a replacement endpoint, the workstation sends it to the hard-coded bifrost.infra.dev.aimstek.cn gateway over HTTP. The package disables TLS certificate verification, so the credential is also exposed to network observers.
AI rationale
The package routes configured LLM credentials to a fixed vendor gateway over plaintext HTTP by default, with TLS verification disabled. This creates a concrete credential disclosure risk when users configure their key without also replacing the default endpoint.
Evidence
server.js.env.example~/.aims-workstation/config/platform.json
Network endpoints1
bifrost.infra.dev.aimstek.cn/v1
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Malicious at 93.0% confidence as Malware with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for block
- The default LLM endpoint is the fixed plaintext URL http://bifrost.infra.dev.aimstek.cn/v1.
- The LLM provider resolves the configured or environment API key and uses it with that endpoint for model requests.
- TLS certificate verification is disabled process-wide.
- The server initializes the LLM provider at startup; model requests and the settings-page connectivity probe can send the key.
Evidence against
- The manifest declares no install, preinstall, or postinstall scripts.
- The README describes a local workstation and says users can configure an arbitrary OpenAI-compatible LLM endpoint.
- Provider initialization alone does not send a request; the key is transmitted when a model request or connectivity probe runs.
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessCryptoEnvironmentVarsEvalFilesystemNetworkShell
HighEntropyStringsMinified
Source & flagged code
7 flaggedserver.jsView file
6// 覆盖所有出站 fetch（ARM REST、LLM、面板代理）。本工具面向内网/本机使用。
L7: process.env.NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED = '0';
L8: const http = require('http');
L9: const fs = require('fs');
...
L23: // ── 代码与数据分离：包目录只放代码与只读资产；全部运行时状态在 AIMS_HOME（缺省 ~/.aims-workstation）──
L24: const PKG_ROOT = __dirname;
L25: const AIMS_HOME = process.env.AIMS_HOME ? path.resolve(process.env.AIMS_HOME) : path.join(os.homedir(), '.aims-workstation');
...
L61: try {
L62: const local = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(to, 'utf8'));
L63: const seed = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(path.join(seedDir, f), 'utf8'));
...
L98: // ro=只读白名单命令名（免确认直行）；sudo_u_l2=true 时 `sudo -u <用户>` 降权形式不再永久拒绝、按写命令走 L2 人工确认（裸 sudo 仍拒绝）
L99: // 默认清单按平台合成：POSIX 为主；Windows（cmd/PowerShell 命令与毁灭性命令）仅在 win32 追加——非 Windows 平台不引入 "format" 等词的误杀
Critical
Credential Exfiltration
Source appears to send environment or credential material to an external endpoint.
server.jsView on unpkg · L66Trigger-reachable chain: scripts.start -> server.js
L6: // 覆盖所有出站 fetch（ARM REST、LLM、面板代理）。本工具面向内网/本机使用。
L7: process.env.NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED = '0';
L8: const http = require('http');
L9: const fs = require('fs');
...
L23: // ── 代码与数据分离：包目录只放代码与只读资产；全部运行时状态在 AIMS_HOME（缺省 ~/.aims-workstation）──
L24: const PKG_ROOT = __dirname;
L25: const AIMS_HOME = process.env.AIMS_HOME ? path.resolve(process.env.AIMS_HOME) : path.join(os.homedir(), '.aims-workstation');
...
L61: try {
L62: const local = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(to, 'utf8'));
L63: const seed = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(path.join(seedDir, f), 'utf8'));
...
L98: // ro=只读白名单命令名（免确认直行）；sudo_u_l2=true 时 `sudo -u <用户>` 降权形式不再永久拒绝、按写命令走 L2 人工确认（裸 sudo 仍拒绝）
L99: // 默认清单按平台合成：POSIX 为主；Windows（cmd/PowerShell 命令与毁灭性命令）仅在 win32 追加——非 Windows
Findings
3 Critical3 High4 Medium6 Low
CriticalCredential Exfiltrationserver.js
CriticalTrigger Reachable Dangerous Capabilityserver.js
CriticalPrevious Version Dangerous Deltaserver.js
HighCredential Redirect Persistenceserver.js
HighTrigger Reachable External Ai Agent Control Surface Mutationserver.js
HighTrigger Reachable Credential Exfiltrationserver.js
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
MediumShips Build Helperscripts/publish-npm.sh
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
LowScripts Present
LowEval
LowFilesystem
LowHigh Entropy Strings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to aims-workstation@0.1.27.
The versions list below shows the verdict for each recorded version.
- Avoid installing aims-workstation@0.1.27. Remove it from direct dependencies and check your lockfile for transitive copies.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
- If this version ran, investigate the affected machine and build environment. Rotate credentials it could access and rebuild from a trusted environment.
Evidence last updated: .
Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.