@thymelab/logfx

@thymelab/logfx (malicious version 2.15.5, published by thymelab-v0et8w@wshu.net) is a trojanized npm package belonging to the wshu.net credential-stealer campaign. The campaign published trojanized look-alike utility packages across 12+ scopes whose publisher accounts all follow the pattern <scope>-<6 random chars>@wshu.net, with every scope created on June 4, 2026 in a ~40-minute burst. This package masquerades as a logger and ships real, working utility code so it passes a glance, while bundling a much larger malicious payload at dist/bootstrap.js. package.json declares a postinstall hook ("node dist/bootstrap.js") that runs the payload automatically on npm install. The payload is heavily obfuscated with javascript-obfuscator (hex-named identifiers, a while (!![]) array-rotation IIFE, base64+RC4 string decoding, control-flow flattening, and runtime-decrypted module resolution to stay out of the static module graph). At runtime it is a Chromium browser credential stealer: it reads Chromium Cookies and Login Data and decrypts saved passwords protected by AES-256-GCM (the v10/v11 app-bound key schemes), then exfiltrates them over HTTPS using a spoofed Mozilla/5.0 user agent. Malicious payload dist/bootstrap.js SHA-256: 4e927f22ad04f4ac9b487ae11412fc2a55210188789ac29f3a47ad77931907a5. --- ## Source: amazon-inspector (edce595ab99f7bcc5404f8c1222a1d8f5a7cbbb1fc6cd6e02aabddaf19526839) @thymelab/logfx@2.15.5 ships a postinstall hook (`postinstall: node dist/bootstrap.js`) that runs a 282KB obfuscator.io-packed script on every `npm install`. The decoded control flow performs HTTPS GETs to a runtime-decrypted URL, AES-256-GCM-decrypts the response using an embedded key, sha256-verifies, stages files into `os.tmpdir()`, chmod's them, and re-spawns them via `process.execPath` using `child_process.spawn` with detached/unref'd handles. The script disables itself when `--inspect`/`--debug` are present (anti-analysis). The destination URL and decryption key are not pinned plaintext — they are decrypted at runtime, giving the publisher a mutable, attacker-controlled execution channel into every installer. Independently, `dist/logfx.js` is a near-verbatim copy of the `unjs/consola` logger and `package.json.repository`/`bugs.url` falsely point to `github.com/unjs/consola`, impersonating that project; an appended IIFE wraps the exported `withTag` API to call `require('./bootstrap').runPrepare()`, so the dropper also detonates when a consumer simply imports the package and uses its documented API. The combination of opaque obfuscation, runtime-decrypted remote URL, tmpdir staging with execPath respawn, anti-debug guard, and import-time trigger is a hostile install-time dropper, not a logging utility. ## Source: ghsa-malware (08f3559a1cc7db65d7283866af8fccef230f7abf56b8439b81fc79efbf35742c) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.