@zyrennofficiall/baileys
A WebSockets library for interacting with WhatsApp Web.
This report shows the evidence for @zyrennofficiall/baileys@5.5.0. 5 of 5 known versions are blocked or flagged. See all versions.
AI Security Review
scanned 54m ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe package performs unsolicited WhatsApp account actions: socket creation schedules follows of four publisher-chosen newsletters, and connection startup follows another hard-coded channel by default. This is malicious under the account-action rule, even though following channels is otherwise a normal library capability.
Static reason
One or more suspicious static signals were detected.; source matched previously finalized malicious package; routed for review; source fingerprint signature matched known malicious package; routed for review
Trigger
Default socket construction schedules newsletter follows; opening the connection triggers another follow.
Impact
Changes the user's account by following channels they did not choose.
Mechanism
The socket uses FOLLOW queries for hard-coded newsletter IDs. The main channel follow runs unless autoFollow is explicitly set to false; newsletter socket construction also schedules four delayed follows.
Attack narrative
When the package creates its socket, it schedules four newsletter FOLLOW requests for hard-coded IDs. Once connected, it also follows a hard-coded update channel by default; users must opt out with autoFollow: false. These actions use the user's WhatsApp account without a request to follow those channels.
AI rationale
The package performs unsolicited WhatsApp account actions: socket creation schedules follows of four publisher-chosen newsletters, and connection startup follows another hard-coded channel by default. This is malicious under the account-action rule, even though following channels is otherwise a normal library capability.
Evidence
lib/Socket/index.jslib/Socket/newsletter.jslib/Socket/username.jslib/Defaults/index.js
Network endpoints2
WhatsApp newsletter servicewss://web.whatsapp.com/ws/chat
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Malicious at 99.0% confidence as Malware with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for block
- Socket creation defaults autoFollow to true and, after the WhatsApp connection opens, follows a hard-coded channel; the code documents only an opt-out.
- Creating the newsletter socket schedules four more hard-coded newsletter follows, decoding their IDs and issuing FOLLOW queries after delays.
- The newsletterFollow method sends the requested newsletter ID through the WhatsApp newsletter FOLLOW operation.
Evidence against
- The preinstall hook only checks the Node.js major version and exits on versions below 20.
- The package describes itself as a WhatsApp Web interaction library, so its normal socket and newsletter operations fit its stated purpose.
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessCryptoFilesystemNetworkShellWebSocket
HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings
Oversized source lightweight scan
WAProto/index.js11.6 MB file, sampled 256 KB
Source & flagged code
9 flaggedpackage.jsonView file
•scripts.preinstall = node ./engine-requirements.js
High
Install Time Lifecycle Scripts
Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkglib/WABinary/constants.jsView file
600patternName = google_api_key
severity = high
line = 600
High
High Secret
Package contains a high-severity secret pattern.
lib/WABinary/constants.jsView on unpkg · L600600patternName = google_api_key
severity = high
line = 600
High
Secret Pattern
Google API key in lib/WABinary/constants.js
lib/WABinary/constants.jsView on unpkg · L600lib/Utils/validate-connection.jsView file
107pull: false,
L108: devicePairingData: {
L109: buildHash: appVersionBuf,
...
L134: const { details, hmac, accountType } = proto.ADVSignedDeviceIdentityHMAC.decode(deviceIdentityNode.content);
L135: let hmacPrefix = Buffer.from([]);
L136: if (accountType !== undefined && accountType === proto.ADVEncryptionType.HOSTED) {
...
L158: ]);
L159: account.deviceSignature = Curve.sign(signedIdentityKey.private, deviceMsg);
L160: const identity = createSignalIdentity(lid, accountSignatureKey);
Low
Weak Crypto
Package source references weak cryptographic algorithms.
lib/Utils/validate-connection.jsView on unpkg · L107WAProto/GenerateStatics.shView file
•path = WAProto/GenerateStatics.sh
kind = build_helper
sizeBytes = 302
magicHex = [redacted]
Medium
Ships Build Helper
Package ships non-JavaScript build or shell helper files.
WAProto/GenerateStatics.shView on unpkgWAProto/index.jsView file
•path = WAProto/index.js
kind = oversized_source_file
sizeBytes = 12145764
magicHex = [redacted]
Medium
Oversized Source File
Package contains source files above the normal full-analysis size ceiling.
WAProto/index.jsView on unpkglib/Utils/business.jsView file
•stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_alias_growth_limit_exceeded; limitedFiles = 3
High
Semantic Analysis Limited
A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review.
lib/Utils/business.jsView on unpkglib/Utils/messages-media.jsView file
•matchType = normalized_sha256
matchedPackage = xzvbailss@1.0.0
matchedPath = lib/Utils/messages-media.js
matchedIdentity = npm:eHp2YmFpbHNz:1.0.0
similarity = 1.000
summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source
High
Known Malware Source Similarity
Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.
lib/Utils/messages-media.jsView on unpkg•matchType = malicious_source_fingerprint_signature
signature = 43e6ef5241588b9e
signatureType = suspicious_hashes
sourceLabel = final_verdict:malicious
matchedPackage = @denzz221/baileys@2.0.0
matchedPath = lib/Utils/messages-media.js
matchedIdentity = npm:QGRlbnp6MjIxL2JhaWxleXM:2.0.0
similarity = 1.000
shingleOverlap = 21
summary = package final verdict is malicious
High
Known Malware Source Fingerprint Signature
Source fingerprint signature matches a known malicious package signature; route for source-aware review.
lib/Utils/messages-media.jsView on unpkgFindings
6 High4 Medium6 Low
HighInstall Time Lifecycle Scriptspackage.json
HighHigh Secretlib/WABinary/constants.js
HighSemantic Analysis Limitedlib/Utils/business.js
HighKnown Malware Source Similaritylib/Utils/messages-media.js
HighKnown Malware Source Fingerprint Signaturelib/Utils/messages-media.js
HighSecret Patternlib/WABinary/constants.js
MediumNetwork
MediumShips Build HelperWAProto/GenerateStatics.sh
MediumOversized Source FileWAProto/index.js
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
LowNon Install Lifecycle Scripts
LowScripts Present
LowWeak Cryptolib/Utils/validate-connection.js
LowFilesystem
LowHigh Entropy Strings
LowUrl Strings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @zyrennofficiall/baileys@5.5.0.
The versions list below shows the verdict for each recorded version.
- Avoid installing @zyrennofficiall/baileys@5.5.0. Remove it from direct dependencies and check your lockfile for transitive copies.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
- If this version ran, investigate the affected machine and build environment. Rotate credentials it could access and rebuild from a trusted environment.
Evidence last updated: .
Source advisory published: .
Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.