aicodeman@1.12.1
Mission control for AI coding agents - run 20 autonomous agents with real-time monitoring and session persistence
AI Security Review
scanned 3mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe package has real install-hook side effects that warrant a warning, but source inspection does not substantiate the scanner's malicious AI-control-hijack claim.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- package.json runs scripts/postinstall.js on install.
- scripts/postinstall.js starts detached dist/index.js web unless CI/CODEMAN_NO_AUTOSTART.
- scripts/postinstall.js writes .git/hooks/pre-commit in a source checkout.
- dist/ai-checker-base.js spawns Claude CLI via detached tmux at runtime.
- Postinstall only probes Claude paths; it does not modify AI-agent configs.
- Auto-start binds/probes 127.0.0.1; no external endpoint is contacted by the hook.
- Git hook is limited to the package's own .git checkout and runs a Prettier check.
- dist/web/self-update.js is runtime/UI-gated, git-install-only, and rejects unrecognized tags.
Source & flagged code
14 flagged · loading sourcePackage defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkgInstall-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.
package.jsonView on unpkgPackage source references child process execution.
dist/ai-checker-base.jsView on unpkg · L24Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to aicodeman@1.12.1.
See all versions of aicodeman for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of aicodeman@1.12.1 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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