aicodeman@1.14.1
Mission control for AI coding agents - run 20 autonomous agents with real-time monitoring and session persistence
AI Security Review
scanned 3mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThis is not confirmed malicious under the install-control policy, but unconsented install-time daemon startup and repository hook mutation create a real lifecycle risk. Downgrade to warn rather than block.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- package.json invokes postinstall.
- scripts/postinstall.js starts detached dist/index.js web unless CI/opt-out.
- postinstall writes .git/hooks/pre-commit for source installs.
- dist/ai-checker-base.js launches Claude via detached tmux sessions.
- Postinstall server defaults to 127.0.0.1:3000.
- Service-unit persistence requires explicit codeman service install.
- Service units omit CODEMAN_PASSWORD and use mode 0600.
- No source evidence of credential harvesting or outbound exfiltration.
Source & flagged code
14 flagged · loading sourcePackage defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkgInstall-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.
package.jsonView on unpkgPackage source references child process execution.
dist/ai-checker-base.jsView on unpkg · L24Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to aicodeman@1.14.1.
See all versions of aicodeman for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of aicodeman@1.14.1 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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