aims-workstation@0.1.16
AIMS 工作站：本地智能体工作站——ARM 助手本地化（下载/离线/升级）、工作台对话式定制、多工作区隔离、分级自主与审计
AI Security Review
scanned 5d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThis is not a clear intentional credential theft flow: the default gateway is documented as the company’s internal LLM service. However, the default LAN exposure and optional authentication let an unauthenticated caller redirect the LLM endpoint and capture the configured key, so the package warrants a warning for this serious vulnerability.
Static reason
High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.; previous stored version diff introduced dangerous source
Trigger
A request to the LAN-accessible server when no access token is configured (the default), followed by PUT /api/settings with an attacker-controlled llm_base_url.
Impact
Disclosure of the configured LLM API key and persistent redirection of subsequent LLM traffic.
Mechanism
The settings handler applies the submitted endpoint and immediately runs an LLM connectivity probe; the provider resolves the existing API key against that endpoint, then the settings are saved.
AI rationale
This is not a clear intentional credential theft flow: the default gateway is documented as the company’s internal LLM service. However, the default LAN exposure and optional authentication let an unauthenticated caller redirect the LLM endpoint and capture the configured key, so the package warrants a warning for this serious vulnerability.
Evidence
server.jsREADME.mdAIMS_HOME/config/platform.json
Network endpoints2
bifrost.infra.dev.aimstek.cn/v1Attacker-supplied HTTP(S) LLM endpoint
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Suspicious at 94.0% confidence as Critical Vulnerability with medium false-positive risk.
Evidence for warning
- The server binds to 0.0.0.0 by default, and API authentication accepts requests when no access token is configured.
- The LLM provider uses the configured API key with the configured base URL.
- The settings API accepts an HTTP(S) LLM endpoint, applies the new configuration, sends a connectivity probe, and saves the configuration.
- The documented default is the company’s Bifrost gateway, and the package describes LLM endpoint configuration as a product feature.
Evidence against
- The manifest declares no install, preinstall, or postinstall hook.
- Sending LLM credentials to a configured endpoint is part of the workstation’s stated purpose; the risk is that unauthenticated LAN callers can change that endpoint.
- The default LLM endpoint is documented as an internal company gateway.
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessCryptoEnvironmentVarsEvalFilesystemNetworkShell
Source & flagged code
6 flaggedserver.jsView file
6// 覆盖所有出站 fetch（ARM REST、LLM、面板代理）。本工具面向内网/本机使用。
L7: process.env.NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED = '0';
L8: const http = require('http');
L9: const fs = require('fs');
...
L23: // ── 代码与数据分离：包目录只放代码与只读资产；全部运行时状态在 AIMS_HOME（缺省 ~/.aims-workstation）──
L24: const PKG_ROOT = __dirname;
L25: const AIMS_HOME = process.env.AIMS_HOME ? path.resolve(process.env.AIMS_HOME) : path.join(os.homedir(), '.aims-workstation');
...
L81: // ro=只读白名单命令名（免确认直行）；sudo_u_l2=true 时 `sudo -u <用户>` 降权形式不再永久拒绝、按写命令走 L2 人工确认（裸 sudo 仍拒绝）
L82: // 默认清单按平台合成：POSIX 为主；Windows（cmd/PowerShell 命令与毁灭性命令）仅在 win32 追加——非 Windows 平台不引入 "format" 等词的误杀
L83: const WIN = process.platform === 'win32';
L84: const GUARD_POSIX = {
...
L116: }
Critical
Credential Exfiltration
Source appears to send environment or credential material to an external endpoint.
server.jsView on unpkg · L66Trigger-reachable chain: scripts.start -> server.js
L6: // 覆盖所有出站 fetch（ARM REST、LLM、面板代理）。本工具面向内网/本机使用。
L7: process.env.NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED = '0';
L8: const http = require('http');
L9: const fs = require('fs');
...
L23: // ── 代码与数据分离：包目录只放代码与只读资产；全部运行时状态在 AIMS_HOME（缺省 ~/.aims-workstation）──
L24: const PKG_ROOT = __dirname;
L25: const AIMS_HOME = process.env.AIMS_HOME ? path.resolve(process.env.AIMS_HOME) : path.join(os.homedir(), '.aims-workstation');
...
L81: // ro=只读白名单命令名（免确认直行）；sudo_u_l2=true 时 `sudo -u <用户>` 降权形式不再永久拒绝、按写命令走 L2 人工确认（裸 sudo 仍拒绝）
L82: // 默认清单按平台合成：POSIX 为主；Windows（cmd/PowerShell 命令与毁灭性命令）仅在 win32 追加——非 Windows 平台不引入 "format" 等词的误杀
L83: const WIN = process.platform === 'win32';
L84: const GUARD_POSIX = {
...
L116: }
Critical
Trigger Reachable Dangerous Capability
Findings
3 Critical2 High4 Medium6 Low
CriticalCredential Exfiltrationserver.js
CriticalTrigger Reachable Dangerous Capabilityserver.js
CriticalPrevious Version Dangerous Deltaserver.js
HighCredential Redirect Persistenceserver.js
HighTrigger Reachable Credential Exfiltrationserver.js
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
MediumShips Build Helperscripts/publish-npm.sh
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
LowScripts Present
LowEval
LowFilesystem
LowHigh Entropy Strings
LowUrl Strings
LowNo License
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to aims-workstation@0.1.16.
See all versions of aims-workstation for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of aims-workstation@0.1.16 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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