registry / aims-workstation / 0.1.18
aims-workstation@0.1.18
AIMS 工作站：本地智能体工作站——ARM 助手本地化（下载/离线/升级）、工作台对话式定制、多工作区隔离、分级自主与审计
AI Security Review
scanned 5d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe source does not establish hidden credential theft: the inspected keys are used with the package’s configured services, and the UI describes the default gateway. However, globally disabling TLS certificate validation exposes outbound credentials and responses to interception, so this is a security risk that warrants a warning.
Static reason
High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.; previous stored version diff introduced dangerous source
Trigger
When the CLI entrypoint loads server.js and the workstation starts making outbound requests.
Impact
A network attacker able to observe or intercept traffic may obtain credentials or alter responses. The default HTTP endpoint also provides no transport encryption.
Mechanism
server.js sets NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED to 0. The LLM provider sends its configured API key to its configured base URL; the default is an HTTP gateway.
AI rationale
The source does not establish hidden credential theft: the inspected keys are used with the package’s configured services, and the UI describes the default gateway. However, globally disabling TLS certificate validation exposes outbound credentials and responses to interception, so this is a security risk that warrants a warning.
Evidence
server.jsweb/dist/assets/index-Cc5q70Fz.js~/.aims-workstation/config/platform.json~/.arm/config.json
Network endpoints3
bifrost.infra.dev.aimstek.cnarm.agent-platform.dev.aimstek.cnUser-configured LLM and ARM endpoints
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Suspicious at 92.0% confidence as Critical Vulnerability with medium false-positive risk.
Evidence for warning
- At startup, server.js disables TLS certificate validation globally for outbound ARM, LLM and proxy requests.
- The LLM provider uses the configured API key with its base URL; the default base URL is an HTTP gateway, and user settings accept either HTTP or HTTPS URLs.
- The UI describes the default gateway as an internal service and says users can switch to their own or public endpoints.
Evidence against
- The code comments say the TLS bypass was chosen for private deployments using self-signed certificates.
- The UI and configuration let users choose the LLM endpoint; the inspected source showed no hidden credential collector.
- ARM tokens are sent to the currently selected ARM source as part of the package’s stated integration.
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessCryptoEnvironmentVarsEvalFilesystemNetworkShell
HighEntropyStringsMinified
Source & flagged code
6 flaggedserver.jsView file
6// 覆盖所有出站 fetch（ARM REST、LLM、面板代理）。本工具面向内网/本机使用。
L7: process.env.NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED = '0';
L8: const http = require('http');
L9: const fs = require('fs');
...
L23: // ── 代码与数据分离：包目录只放代码与只读资产；全部运行时状态在 AIMS_HOME（缺省 ~/.aims-workstation）──
L24: const PKG_ROOT = __dirname;
L25: const AIMS_HOME = process.env.AIMS_HOME ? path.resolve(process.env.AIMS_HOME) : path.join(os.homedir(), '.aims-workstation');
...
L81: // ro=只读白名单命令名（免确认直行）；sudo_u_l2=true 时 `sudo -u <用户>` 降权形式不再永久拒绝、按写命令走 L2 人工确认（裸 sudo 仍拒绝）
L82: // 默认清单按平台合成：POSIX 为主；Windows（cmd/PowerShell 命令与毁灭性命令）仅在 win32 追加——非 Windows 平台不引入 "format" 等词的误杀
L83: const WIN = process.platform === 'win32';
L84: const GUARD_POSIX = {
...
L127: function loadCfg() {
Critical
Credential Exfiltration
Source appears to send environment or credential material to an external endpoint.
server.jsView on unpkg · L66Trigger-reachable chain: scripts.start -> server.js
L6: // 覆盖所有出站 fetch（ARM REST、LLM、面板代理）。本工具面向内网/本机使用。
L7: process.env.NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED = '0';
L8: const http = require('http');
L9: const fs = require('fs');
...
L23: // ── 代码与数据分离：包目录只放代码与只读资产；全部运行时状态在 AIMS_HOME（缺省 ~/.aims-workstation）──
L24: const PKG_ROOT = __dirname;
L25: const AIMS_HOME = process.env.AIMS_HOME ? path.resolve(process.env.AIMS_HOME) : path.join(os.homedir(), '.aims-workstation');
...
L81: // ro=只读白名单命令名（免确认直行）；sudo_u_l2=true 时 `sudo -u <用户>` 降权形式不再永久拒绝、按写命令走 L2 人工确认（裸 sudo 仍拒绝）
L82: // 默认清单按平台合成：POSIX 为主；Windows（cmd/PowerShell 命令与毁灭性命令）仅在 win32 追加——非 Windows 平台不引入 "format" 等词的误杀
L83: const WIN = process.platform === 'win32';
L84: const GUARD_POSIX = {
...
L127: function loadCfg() {
Critical
Findings
3 Critical2 High4 Medium6 Low
CriticalCredential Exfiltrationserver.js
CriticalTrigger Reachable Dangerous Capabilityserver.js
CriticalPrevious Version Dangerous Deltaserver.js
HighCredential Redirect Persistenceserver.js
HighTrigger Reachable Credential Exfiltrationserver.js
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
MediumShips Build Helperscripts/publish-npm.sh
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
LowScripts Present
LowEval
LowFilesystem
LowHigh Entropy Strings
LowUrl Strings
LowNo License
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to aims-workstation@0.1.18.
See all versions of aims-workstation for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of aims-workstation@0.1.18 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.