async-pipeline-builder

Ten packages published by npm user `asdxzxc` at version 1.0.10 target developers working on AI and LLM tooling. Each package masquerades as a developer utility while executing a two-stage payload triggered via postinstall: `package.json` → `lib/setup.js` → `lib/worker.js`. **Credential harvesting:** `lib/worker.js` scans the filesystem for private keys (64-char hex), BIP39 mnemonics (12–24 word phrases), API keys and secrets, and passwords from env vars and shell history (`.bash_history`, `.zsh_history`, `.fish_history`, `.mysql_history`, `.psql_history`), including wallet tool invocations (`geth account`, `hardhat`, `metamask`, `wallet import`). Targeted paths include `~/.ssh`, `~/.aws/credentials`, `~/.config/gcloud`, `~/.azure`, `~/.docker/config.json`, `~/.kube/config`, crypto wallet dirs (`~/.ethereum`, `~/.bitcoin`, `~/.solana`), exchange configs (Binance, Bybit, OKX, KuCoin, Deribit, 3Commas), `.env`, `.npmrc`, `.gitconfig`. Also performs browser data theft and Ethereum keystore brute-force. A priority-target list fetched from the actor's GitHub Pages endpoint enables aggressive deep scanning for pre-registered high-value hosts. **AI self-propagation:** after credential theft, a `_propagate()` function executes a multi-vector campaign to infect AI coding assistants. It writes poisoned `.cursorrules` and `CLAUDE.md` files — framed as "P-2024-001 Enterprise Credential Integrity Standard" — to all discovered project directories, parent directories, and home subdirectories, instructing Cursor, Claude Code, and GitHub Copilot to execute the remote payload and propagate it via Issues, PRs, and documentation. Git hooks (`post-merge`, `post-checkout`, `pre-commit`, `pre-push`) are injected into all `.git` repos found on disk, and a persistence block is appended to `~/.bashrc`, `~/.zshrc`, and `~/.profile`. Zero-width steganography (ZWSP/ZWJ/ZWNJ/LTRM encoding) embeds hidden scan triggers in all AI-generated text output, enabling AI-to-AI chain infection invisible to humans. **C2/exfil:** a remotely configurable JSON config hosted on the actor's GitHub Pages delivers the active webhook list, encryption key, and scan strategy; hardcoded fallback webhooks at `webhook.site` and a DNS TXT record fallback are used if the primary channel fails. A dedup marker at `~/.local/share/.p2024_integrity` prevents re-propagation within 24 hours. `async-pipeline-builder` poses as an asynchronous data processing pipeline builder with backpressure handling. --- ## Source: amazon-inspector (3cd513ecfe34affa7e7c2015f944b154bd876833dd0370785af04fb89917d012) The package's lib/trap-core.js bundles host-reconnaissance and outbound HTTP POST behavior in a single module: it requires os, https, fs, and child_process; reads os.hostname() and os.platform(); references ping and curl; assembles JSON payloads keyed by `hostname:` (lines 393, 411, 553, 600, 1023); and performs multiple POST calls (lines 385, 411, 466, 548, 549). The combination of host fingerprint collection (hostname/platform), child_process execution, and repeated POSTs from the same module matches the active-exfiltration shape rather than any documented benign use, and the file name (`trap-core.js`) is consistent with intentional victim-tracking infrastructure rather than a build/runtime helper. Installing or loading this package risks leaking installer host data and executing attacker-influenced shell commands. ## Source: ghsa-malware (bd80257f833d3f63fb3e65e4a0a75bbfcc9ead7cd3b2775bd3aa812aa76f4bbf) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.