banana-stand

On `npm install`, the package's `install` lifecycle hook runs `node index.js`, which loads `lib/core.js`. That module reads `os.userInfo().username`, `os.hostname()`, and the basename of `process.cwd()`, then issues a `dns.resolve4` lookup for `lwbanana.<username>.<hostname>.<cwd>.<unixtime>.oob.sl4x0.xyz`, smuggling host identifiers out-of-band via DNS to an author-controlled domain. The same path also fires on `require('banana-stand')` because `main` points at the same entry. Strings used to construct the exfil (`os`, `dns`, `userInfo`, `hostname`, `cwd`, `resolve4`, and the destination domain `oob.sl4x0.xyz`) are concealed as `String.fromCharCode` byte arrays in `lib/6ad264.js` and `lib/b02e30.js` and decoded at runtime, indicating intentional concealment of the exfiltration channel. ## Source: ghsa-malware (902b356a065dc04d1ff168e0c0b9b8dc31ca04a33c1ed4c3ca4eaa197a644a77) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.