beaver-ui-items-with-more

The package's declared postinstall (`node setup.js`) and its main entry `index.js` (which unconditionally calls `require('./setup')`) fetch a platform-specific executable from string-fragmented Cloudflare Workers hostnames (reassembled at runtime from arrays via `.join('')`, e.g. `oob-worker.cfNN-XXX.workers.dev`) with a DNS-TXT base64 covert-channel fallback under `*.dl.well1.site`. The downloaded bytes are written to `/var/tmp` or `%TEMP%` under a hidden randomized name (`.cache_<hex>` / `dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe`), chmod 0755 on Unix, and launched detached via `execFile` with `child.unref()`. No hash or signature verification, no pinning, and the destinations are obfuscated to evade static hostname scanning. setup.js also uses `child_process` including `execSync('powershell...')`. The behavior fires both on `npm install` (postinstall) and on `require()` of the package, giving the operator of the fetched binary full-host code execution on the installer. ## Source: ghsa-malware (7bbe189f5c1de0f1dfa82a7b532b58ce8b91852acbba632a941a5f3281aafb4d) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.