blinkit-core

On `npm install`, the package's `preinstall` lifecycle hook runs `curl` against `http://d8s0b82plbq3u5sb2vo0sb3a9obr4yjt7.oast.site/` and POSTs the installer's hostname (`hostname -f`), current user (`whoami`), working directory, and a base64-encoded dump of the entire process environment (`env | base64 -w0`) — which on CI/build hosts routinely contains tokens, cloud credentials, and registry auth. The package itself is hollow: `index.js` only exports `{ name, version }` and provides no functionality. The `repository.url` claims `git+https://github.com/zomato/blinkit-core.git` while publishing under that internal-sounding name on the public registry, matching the canonical dependency-confusion attacker shape against Zomato's internal `blinkit-core` namespace. Installer harm: any build pipeline that resolves this public package instead of an internal mirror leaks host identity and the full environment (including secrets) to the attacker's out-of-band interaction listener at install time, before any other code runs. ## Source: ossf-package-analysis (304234c334dce7d26c040f318d608e24b53db9b0b7b0b27d3a6dd2c040481b15) The OpenSSF Package Analysis project identified 'blinkit-core' @ 1.0.0 (npm) as malicious. It is considered malicious because: - The package communicates with a domain associated with malicious activity. - The package executes one or more commands associated with malicious behavior.