bodega-sdk

flow/surf-lending DeFi cred-exfil campaign sibling (c1655). preinstall `node index.js || true` exfils env secrets to raw C2 2.25.140.71:8443/surflending/npm-confusion (verified identical). No-renotify. --- ## Source: amazon-inspector (75aea05ceba339fbc9f0764e178d0cac8170219115218d635b14639ec01410a4) package.json declares `preinstall: node index.js`, which fires automatically on `npm install`. index.js collects host identifiers (os.hostname(), os.userInfo().username, cwd) and enumerates process.env, filtering keys by the regex /key|seed|secret|token|private|mnemonic|password|blockfrost|redis|telegram|batcher/i to capture credential-shaped values (API keys, seed phrases, mnemonics, private keys, Telegram bot tokens, Blockfrost keys, Redis URLs, batcher keys). The harvested JSON is POSTed to https://2.25.140.71:8443/surflending/npm-confusion — a hardcoded bare-IP endpoint. The attacker-chosen URL path `/surflending/npm-confusion` and the sentinel version 9.9.9 indicate a dependency-confusion attack targeting a private `bodega-sdk` package (likely SurfLending/Bodega DEX on Cardano): any organization with an internal package of this name risks the public copy resolving on install, leaking credentials from CI runners and developer machines unconditionally. ## Source: ghsa-malware (fbdcacc3104a9f8f465f677b36d460e4f56e50654720b0d0bc0217e58f9bd6ce) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.