registry / Remote code execution / burnboard-cli / 0.3.8

burnboard-cli@0.3.8

Connect local AI coding token usage to BurnBoard

AI Security Review

scanned 1mo ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

This is an explicit-command BurnBoard installer, not an npm install hook, but it still pulls and runs unsigned remote JavaScript, then persists it and edits Claude Code settings. That is a real dual-use control surface, not a confirmed malware drop.

Static reason

One or more suspicious static signals were detected.

Trigger

User runs burnboard or burnboard-cli connect or setup; later scheduled sync and update jobs keep running.

Impact

Unreviewed remote code runs with the user's account, can persist and self-update, and can change Claude Code telemetry settings.

Mechanism

Remote tracker download, scheduled execution, and Claude settings rewrite

AI rationale

Evidence

cli.mjsinstall/burnboard-setup.shinstall/burnboard-setup.ps1~/.burnboard/agent.mjs~/.burnboard/config.json~/.claude/settings.json~/.config/systemd/user/burnboard-sync.service~/.config/autostart/burnboard.desktop

Network endpoints4

burnboard.ccburnboard.cc/api/connectburnboard.cc/api/enrollburnboard.cc/burnboard-agent.mjs

Decision evidence

public snapshot

AI called this Suspicious at 86.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with medium false-positive risk.

Evidence for warning

User-run setup downloads unsigned burnboard-agent.mjs from the server into ~/.burnboard and then executes it.
Setup installs persistence: cron or systemd timers run the agent every five minutes and npx burnboard-cli@latest update daily.
Setup writes ~/.claude/settings.json, creating ~/.claude if needed and deleting Claude Code OpenTelemetry environment keys.
connect posts hostname, platform, and CLI version to the server, then runs the same installer.
Windows setup downloads the same remote agent and registers hidden scheduled tasks.

Evidence against

package.json has no preinstall, install, or postinstall hooks; only user-invoked bin commands plus author-only prepack.
Hosts stay on burnboard.cc and match the stated token-usage tracker product.
Published source is readable and does not scrape SSH keys, .env files, or unrelated secrets.
Scanner host-fingerprint and sandbox-evasion labels map to device pairing and a time-based update skip, not gated malware.
disconnect removes schedulers, systemd units, and ~/.burnboard.

Behavioral surface

Source

ChildProcessEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetworkShell

Supply chain

HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings

Manifest

NoLicense

scanned 1 file(s), 10.3 KB of source, external domains: burnboard.cc

Source & flagged code

4 flagged

cli.mjsView file

Lines 1-24javascript

1#!/usr/bin/env node

2import fs from "node:fs";

3import os from "node:os";

4import path from "node:path";

5import { spawnSync } from "node:child_process";

6import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url";

8const packageRoot = path.dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url));

9const installRoot = path.join(packageRoot, "install");

10const burnboardRoot = path.join(os.homedir(), ".burnboard");

11const cliVersion = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(path.join(packageRoot, "package.json"), "utf8")).version;

12const installedVersionPath = path.join(burnboardRoot, "cli-version");

13const lastUpdateCheckPath = path.join(burnboardRoot, "last-update-check");

14const command = process.argv[2] || "help";

15const args = process.argv.slice(3);

17function option(name, fallback) {

18 const index = args.indexOf(name);

19 return index >= 0 ? args[index + 1] : fallback;

20}

22function run(executable, runArgs) {

23 const result = spawnSync(executable, runArgs, { stdio: "inherit" });

24 if (result.error) throw result.error;

High

Host Fingerprint Exfiltration

Source collects local host identity data and sends it to an external endpoint.

cli.mjsView on unpkg · L4

High

Sandbox Evasion Gated Capability

Source gates dangerous network, credential, or execution behavior behind CI, host, platform, time, or geo fingerprint checks.

cli.mjsView on unpkg · L4

install/burnboard-setup.shView file

Lines 1-34text

1#!/usr/bin/env bash

2set -euo pipefail

3NAME="${1:?Usage: burnboard-setup.sh NAME [SERVER_URL]}"; SERVER_URL="${2:-https://burnboard.cc}"; MODE="${3:-setup}"

4command -v node >/dev/null || { echo "Node.js is required." >&2; exit 1; }

5INSTALL_DIR="$HOME/.burnboard"; CONFIG="$INSTALL_DIR/config.json"; mkdir -p "$INSTALL_DIR" "$HOME/.claude"

6printf '[1/5] Preparing BurnBoard profile...\n'

7if [[ -f "$CONFIG" ]] && node -e 'const c=JSON.parse(require("fs").readFileSync(process.argv[1]));process.exit(c.serverUrl===process.argv[2]&&c.token?0:1)' "$CONFIG" "$SERVER_URL"; then

8 TOKEN="$(node -e 'console.log(JSON.parse(require("fs").readFileSync(process.argv[1])).token)' "$CONFIG")"

9 PROFILE="$(node -e 'const c=JSON.parse(require("fs").readFileSync(process.argv[1]));console.log((c.profileUrl||(`/builder/${process.argv[2].toLowerCase().replace(/[^a-z0-9]+/g,"-").replace(/^-|-$/g,"")||"builder"}`)).replace(/^\/intern\//,"/builder/"))' "$CONFIG" "$NAME")"

Source & flagged code

4 flagged · loading source

cli.mjsView file

4import path from "node:path"; L5: import { spawnSync } from "node:child_process"; L6: import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url"; ... L9: const installRoot = path.join(packageRoot, "install"); L10: const burnboardRoot = path.join(os.homedir(), ".burnboard"); L11: const cliVersion = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(path.join(packageRoot, "package.json"), "utf8")).version; L12: const installedVersionPath = path.join(burnboardRoot, "cli-version"); ... L24: if (result.error) throw result.error; L25: process.exitCode = result.status ?? 1; L26: return result.status ?? 1; ... L34: if (fs.existsSync(existingConfigPath)) try { savedServer = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(existingConfigPath, "utf8").replace(/^\uFEFF/, "")).serverUrl; } catch {} L35: const server = requestedServer || serverOverride || (mode

High

Host Fingerprint Exfiltration

Source collects local host identity data and sends it to an external endpoint.

cli.mjsView on unpkg · L4

High

Sandbox Evasion Gated Capability

Source gates dangerous network, credential, or execution behavior behind CI, host, platform, time, or geo fingerprint checks.

cli.mjsView on unpkg · L4

install/burnboard-setup.shView file

•path = install/burnboard-setup.sh kind = build_helper sizeBytes = 6877 magicHex = [redacted]

Medium

Ships Build Helper

Package ships non-JavaScript build or shell helper files.

install/burnboard-setup.shView on unpkg

14printf '[2/5] Downloading tracker...\n'; curl -fsS "$SERVER_URL/burnboard-agent.mjs" -o "$INSTALL_DIR/agent.mjs"

Medium

Ai Review Evidence

User-run setup downloads unsigned burnboard-agent.mjs from the server into ~/.burnboard and then executes it.

install/burnboard-setup.shView on unpkg · L14

Findings

2 High5 Medium5 Low

HighHost Fingerprint Exfiltrationcli.mjs

HighSandbox Evasion Gated Capabilitycli.mjs

MediumNetwork

MediumEnvironment Vars

MediumShips Build Helperinstall/burnboard-setup.sh

MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review

MediumAi Review Evidenceinstall/burnboard-setup.sh

LowScripts Present

LowFilesystem

LowHigh Entropy Strings

LowUrl Strings

LowNo License

Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to burnboard-cli@0.3.8.

See all versions of burnboard-cli for other recorded verdicts.

Review the evidence and your use of burnboard-cli@0.3.8 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.

Evidence last updated: 2026-09-17 11:18:54.269Z (UTC).

Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.