registry / Remote code execution / burnboard-cli
burnboard-cli
Connect local AI coding token usage to BurnBoard
This report shows the evidence for burnboard-cli@0.3.5. 2 of 17 known versions are blocked or flagged. The newest version, 0.4.6, is flagged. See all versions.
AI Security Review
scanned 2mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe package is an active remote-payload installer with concealed persistence and foreign AI-tool configuration mutation. Although it lacks npm lifecycle hooks, these concrete behaviors warrant blocking.
Static reason
One or more suspicious static signals were detected.; source matched previously finalized malicious package; routed for review
Trigger
User runs burnboard connect, setup, or update.
Impact
A server-controlled agent runs repeatedly and can change over time outside the reviewed package.
Mechanism
Remote payload download, execution, and hidden persistent scheduling.
Attack narrative
On an explicit setup path, the package downloads a JavaScript tracker from a mutable server URL, writes it under the user home directory, and executes it. It persists recurring tracker execution and self-updates via cron, systemd, autostart, or hidden Windows scheduled-task launchers. It also removes Claude telemetry settings. The shipped source does not contain the downloaded tracker, so its ongoing token/history collection behavior is server-controlled and unreviewable.
AI rationale
The package is an active remote-payload installer with concealed persistence and foreign AI-tool configuration mutation. Although it lacks npm lifecycle hooks, these concrete behaviors warrant blocking.
Evidence
package.jsoncli.mjsinstall/burnboard-setup.shinstall/burnboard-setup.ps1~/.burnboard/agent.mjs~/.burnboard/config.json~/.claude/settings.json~/.config/systemd/user/burnboard-sync.service~/.config/autostart/burnboard.desktop
Network endpoints2
burnboard.ccburnboard.cc/burnboard-agent.mjs
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Malicious at 98.0% confidence as Malware with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for block
- Explicit setup downloads an unpinned remote agent into ~/.burnboard and executes it.
- Setup persists that remote agent every five minutes and installs automatic package updates.
- Windows persistence uses hidden VBS launchers and scheduled tasks.
- Setup rewrites ~/.claude/settings.json, deleting Claude telemetry environment settings.
Evidence against
- package.json has no npm preinstall, install, or postinstall hook.
- Setup is reached through explicit CLI connect/setup/update commands, not import-time execution.
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetworkShell
HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings
NoLicense
Source & flagged code
5 flagged · loading sourcecli.mjsView file
4import path from "node:path";
L5: import { spawnSync } from "node:child_process";
L6: import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url";
...
L9: const installRoot = path.join(packageRoot, "install");
L10: const burnboardRoot = path.join(os.homedir(), ".burnboard");
L11: const cliVersion = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(path.join(packageRoot, "package.json"), "utf8")).version;
L12: const installedVersionPath = path.join(burnboardRoot, "cli-version");
...
L24: if (result.error) throw result.error;
L25: process.exitCode = result.status ?? 1;
L26: return result.status ?? 1;
...
L34: if (fs.existsSync(existingConfigPath)) try { savedServer = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(existingConfigPath, "utf8").replace(/^\uFEFF/, "")).serverUrl; } catch {}
L35: const server = requestedServer || serverOverride || (mode
High
Host Fingerprint Exfiltration
Source collects local host identity data and sends it to an external endpoint.
cli.mjsView on unpkg · L4•Manifest-reachable source resolves another installed package, overwrites its runtime code, and injects package-defined remote behavior.
cli.mjs:
const server = requestedServer || serverOverride || (mode !== "connect" ? savedServer : undefined) || "https://burnboard.cc";
fs.writeFileSync(installedVersionPath, `${cliVersion}\n`);
fs.writeFileSync(lastUpdateCheckPath, `${new Date().toISOString()}\n`);
const server = option("--server", "https://burnboard.cc");
fs.writeFileSync(path.join(burnboardRoot, "config.json"), `${JSON.stringify({ serverUrl:server, token:body.token, profileUrl:body.profileUrl }, null, 2)}\n`);
fs.writeFileSync(lastUpdateCheckPath, `${new Date().toISOString()}\n`);
High
Entrypoint Foreign Package Code Overwrite
Manifest-reachable source overwrites another installed package with package-defined remote behavior.
Findings
4 High4 Medium5 Low
HighHost Fingerprint Exfiltrationcli.mjs
HighEntrypoint Foreign Package Code Overwritecli.mjs
HighSandbox Evasion Gated Capabilitycli.mjs
HighKnown Malware Source Similarityinstall/burnboard-setup.sh
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
MediumShips Build Helperinstall/burnboard-setup.sh
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
LowScripts Present
LowFilesystem
LowHigh Entropy Strings
LowUrl Strings
LowNo License
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to burnboard-cli@0.3.5.
The versions list below shows the verdict for each recorded version.
- Avoid installing burnboard-cli@0.3.5. Remove it from direct dependencies and check your lockfile for transitive copies.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
- If this version ran, investigate the affected machine and build environment. Rotate credentials it could access and rebuild from a trusted environment.
Evidence last updated: .
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