burnboard-cli@0.4.0

Connect local AI coding token usage to BurnBoard

AI Security Review

scanned 2mo ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

The package creates a persistent remotely controlled token-tracking agent and mutates a third-party AI tool configuration, but only after an explicit CLI action. The absence of lifecycle hooks prevents a malicious install-time verdict.

Static reason

High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.

Trigger

The user runs the CLI's join, connect, setup, or update flow.

Impact

A server-controlled tracker can access and transmit data under the user's account repeatedly after setup.

Mechanism

Remote tracker download, Claude Code settings mutation, and scheduled execution.

AI rationale

Evidence

package.jsoncli.mjsinstall/burnboard-setup.shinstall/burnboard-setup.ps1~/.burnboard/agent.mjs~/.burnboard/config.json$HOME/.claude/settings.jsoncrontab$XDG_CONFIG_HOME/systemd/user/burnboard-sync.service$XDG_CONFIG_HOME/systemd/user/burnboard-sync.timer

Network endpoints1

burnboard.cc/burnboard-agent.mjs

Decision evidence

public snapshot

AI called this Suspicious at 90.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with low false-positive risk.

Evidence for warning

The user-invoked setup downloads a remote tracker into the user profile and then runs it.
Setup removes telemetry-related settings from Claude Code's settings file.
Setup persists the remotely supplied tracker on a five-minute schedule and self-updates daily from the latest package version.

Evidence against

The manifest has no preinstall, install, or postinstall hook.
The behavior is reached through explicit CLI commands, not package installation.
The bundled source names its default service endpoint and contains no direct credential harvesting or exfiltration implementation.

Behavioral surface

Source

ChildProcessCryptoEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetworkShell

Supply chain

HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings

Manifest

NoLicense

scanned 1 file(s), 16.2 KB of source, external domains: burnboard.cc

Source & flagged code

7 flagged

cli.mjsView file

Lines 1-24javascript

1#!/usr/bin/env node

2import fs from "node:fs";

3import os from "node:os";

4import path from "node:path";

5import { spawn, spawnSync } from "node:child_process";

6import { randomUUID } from "node:crypto";

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

cli.mjsView on unpkg · L4

7import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url";

8import * as prompts from "@clack/prompts";

9import pc from "picocolors";

11const packageRoot = path.dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url));

12const installRoot = path.join(packageRoot, "install");

13const burnboardRoot = path.join(os.homedir(), ".burnboard");

14const cliVersion = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(path.join(packageRoot, "package.json"), "utf8")).version;

15const installedVersionPath = path.join(burnboardRoot, "cli-version");

16const lastUpdateCheckPath = path.join(burnboardRoot, "last-update-check");

17const installationIdPath = path.join(burnboardRoot, "installation-id");

18const firstArgument = process.argv[2];

19const optionOnly = Boolean(firstArgument?.startsWith("-") && !["--help", "-h"].includes(firstArgument));

20const command = optionOnly ? "join" : firstArgument || "join";

21const args = process.argv.slice(optionOnly ? 2 : 3);

22const richTerminal = Boolean(process.stdout.isTTY && process.stdin.isTTY);

23const brandColorEnabled = richTerminal && !process.env.NO_COLOR && process.env.TERM !== "dumb";

24const brandColor = (red, green, blue) => (value) => brandColorEnabled

Critical

Hardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltration

Source sends credentials or rich application records to a package-controlled external receiver enabled by default.

cli.mjsView on unpkg · L4

High

Sandbox Evasion Gated Capability

Source gates dangerous network, credential, or execution behavior behind CI, host, platform, time, or geo fingerprint checks.

cli.mjsView on unpkg · L4

Lines 75-129javascript

75 const command = process.platform === "win32" ? "rundll32.exe" : process.platform === "darwin" ? "open" : "xdg-open";

76 const

•Manifest-reachable source resolves another installed package, overwrites its runtime code, and injects package-defined remote behavior. cli.mjs: fs.writeFileSync(installationIdPath, `${created}\n`); fs.writeFileSync(path.join(burnboardRoot, "config.json"), `${JSON.stringify({ serverUrl:server, token:enrollment.token, profileUrl:enrollment.profileUrl }, null, 2)}\n`); const server = requestedServer || serverOverride || (mode !== "connect" ? savedServer : undefined) || "https://burnboard.cc"; fs.writeFileSync(installedVersionPath, `${cliVersion}\n`); fs.writeFileSync(lastUpdateCheckPath, `${new Date().toISOString()}\n`); const server = option("--server", "https://burnboard.cc"); const server = option("--server", "https://burnboard.cc").replace(/\/$/, ""); fs.writeFileSync(lastUpdateCheckPath

High

Entrypoint Foreign Package Code Overwrite

Manifest-reachable source overwrites another installed package with package-defined remote behavior.

cli.mjsView on unpkg

install/burnboard-setup.shView file

•path = install/burnboard-setup.sh kind = build_helper sizeBytes = 7402 magicHex = [redacted]

Medium

Ships Build Helper

Package ships non-JavaScript build or shell helper files.

install/burnboard-setup.shView on unpkg

Source & flagged code

7 flagged · loading source

cli.mjsView file

4Source sends the broad process environment to a literal external destination. L4: import path from "node:path"; L5: import { spawn, spawnSync } from "node:child_process"; L6: import { randomUUID } from "node:crypto"; ... L12: const installRoot = path.join(packageRoot, "install"); L13: const burnboardRoot = path.join(os.homedir(), ".burnboard"); L14: const cliVersion = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(path.join(packageRoot, "package.json"), "utf8")).version; L15: const installedVersionPath = path.join(burnboardRoot, "cli-version"); ... L21: const args = process.argv.slice(optionOnly ? 2 : 3); L22: const richTerminal = Boolean(process.stdout.isTTY && process.stdin.isTTY); L23: const brandColorEnabled = richTerminal && !process.env.NO_COLOR && process.env.TERM !== "dumb"; L24: const brandColor = (r

Critical

Hardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltration

Source sends credentials or rich application records to a package-controlled external receiver enabled by default.

cli.mjsView on unpkg · L4

4import path from "node:path"; L5: import { spawn, spawnSync } from "node:child_process"; L6: import { randomUUID } from "node:crypto";

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

cli.mjsView on unpkg · L4

109if (process.platform === "win32") { L110: status = run("powershell.exe", ["-NoLogo", "-NoProfile", "-ExecutionPolicy", "Bypass", "-File", path.join(installRoot, "burnboard-setup.ps1"), "-Name", name, "-ServerUrl", server],... L111: } else {

Findings

1 Critical5 High4 Medium5 Low

CriticalHardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltrationcli.mjs

HighChild Processcli.mjs

HighShellcli.mjs

HighSame File Env Network Executioncli.mjs

HighEntrypoint Foreign Package Code Overwritecli.mjs

HighSandbox Evasion Gated Capabilitycli.mjs

MediumNetwork

MediumEnvironment Vars

MediumShips Build Helperinstall/burnboard-setup.sh

MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review

LowScripts Present

LowFilesystem

LowHigh Entropy Strings

LowUrl Strings

LowNo License

Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to burnboard-cli@0.4.0.

See all versions of burnboard-cli for other recorded verdicts.

Review the evidence and your use of burnboard-cli@0.4.0 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.

Evidence last updated: 2026-08-27 11:40:57.498Z (UTC).

Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.