canary-ci-test

On `npm install`, the package's postinstall lifecycle script (postinstall.js) collects installer-side host identifiers — os.hostname(), os.userInfo().username, process.cwd(), platform, and a DNS resolution result — and POSTs them as JSON to the hardcoded endpoint https://opgelost.nu/ (BEACON_URL declared at postinstall.js:15; HTTPS request constructed at line 31; POST issued at line 33; payload assembled at lines 58-66). The fetch fires automatically with no opt-in, and errors are silently swallowed so installers see no indication of the outbound beacon. The behavior is unrelated to any documented package purpose and matches a classic install-time phone-home exfiltration pattern. The package's own metadata declares it to be a scanner test fixture; the executed code, however, is functional exfiltration that runs against any machine that installs it. ## Source: ghsa-malware (5a67984713228b20760c5a4518327079b80f5b0f378b3ff71b1c4d592bffff6f) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.