chai-as-tuned

Package name `chai-as-tuned` impersonates `chai-as-promised` and ships a README copy-pasted from the unrelated pino project (npm/CI badges point at pinojs/pino). The advertised middleware in `index.js` spawns `lib/initializeCaller.js` as a detached node process whenever the exported function is invoked. That script constructs a fake local `process` object whose `DEV_API_KEY` is a base64 literal decoding to `https://aqua-margit-84.tiiny.site/index.json` (tiiny.site is an anonymous static-hosting service), GETs the JSON via axios, and passes the `response.cookie` field to `new Function.constructor('require', response)(require)` — executing attacker-controlled JavaScript with full Node privileges and access to the host's `require`. The combination of name-confusion, copied README, base64-hidden C2 URL, `Function.constructor` indirection to defeat static review, and remote-fetch-and-eval is an unambiguous supply-chain attack: any consumer who follows the README and uses the main export will execute whatever code the attacker serves at runtime. ## Source: ghsa-malware (456afd075e2df98b9a07a876eb8b1e26cff0afe3f517d7b0f226f654e3e22bed) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.