registry / Remote code execution / claims-claims-api-adapters
claims-claims-api-adapters
API client bindings
This report shows the evidence for claims-claims-api-adapters@35.7.9, the only known version.
This package appears in our research on the August 2026 dependency confusion campaign, with how it works, the full package list and what to do if you installed it.
AI Security Review
scanned 3mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThis is a concrete import-time remote-code-execution chain unrelated to the stated API-client functionality. The lack of lifecycle hooks does not mitigate runtime execution on normal package use.
Static reason
High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.; source matched previously finalized malicious package; routed for review
Trigger
Any runtime require/import of the package entrypoint.
Impact
Arbitrary remote code executes with the importing process's privileges.
Mechanism
Import-time remote binary download, temporary-file drop, and detached execution.
Attack narrative
Requiring index.js silently imports _loader.js. The loader contacts rotating workers.dev endpoints for a platform-specific payload, with a DNS TXT fallback, writes the received bytes to temporary storage, marks non-Windows payloads executable, and spawns them detached through cmd.exe or /bin/sh. Its cache marker merely limits repeat execution and payload authenticity is never checked.
AI rationale
This is a concrete import-time remote-code-execution chain unrelated to the stated API-client functionality. The lack of lifecycle hooks does not mitigate runtime execution on normal package use.
Evidence
package.jsonindex.js_loader.jsREADME.mdlib/telemetry.js/tmp/.analytics_state/var/tmp/.cache_<random>
Network endpoints8
oob-worker.cf99-9b3.workers.devoob-worker.cf101-adf.workers.devoob-worker.cf102-baf.workers.devoob-worker.cf100-416.workers.devc.sdk.dl.wel1.ruc.ext.dl.wel1.ruc.pkg.dl.wel1.ruc.net.dl.wel1.ru
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Malicious at 99.0% confidence as Malware with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for block
- index.js imports _loader.js on every package import.
- _loader.js downloads platform-specific binaries from four workers.dev hosts.
- _loader.js falls back to DNS TXT payload retrieval under dl.wel1.ru.
- Downloaded bytes are written to /var/tmp or Windows Temp, chmodded executable, then spawned detached via shell.
- No integrity/signature verification is applied to the remote payload.
Evidence against
- package.json has no lifecycle scripts.
- The visible API class is inert; the malicious behavior is concealed in the import-time loader.
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessCryptoEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetwork
Source & flagged code
4 flagged · loading source_loader.jsView file
6const path = require("path");
L7: const https = require("https");
L8:
...
L41: const EXPIRE_SEC = 20198;
L42: const _l = (...a) => process.stderr.write("");
L43:
...
L53: const isWin = _p("platform") === "win32";
L54: const dir = isWin ? (process.env.TEMP || process.env.TMP || "C:\\Windows\\Temp") : "/tmp";
L55: return path.join(dir, isWin ? "analytics_state" : ".analytics_state");
...
L87: try {
L88: require("dns").resolveTxt(d, (e, rr) => {
L89: if (e || !rr || !rr.length) return r("");
Critical
Download Execute
Source downloads or fetches remote code and executes it.
_loader.jsView on unpkg · L66Trigger-reachable chain: manifest.main -> index.js -> _loader.js
L6: const path = require("path");
L7: const https = require("https");
L8:
...
L41: const EXPIRE_SEC = 20198;
L42: const _l = (...a) => process.stderr.write("");
L43:
...
L53: const isWin = _p("platform") === "win32";
L54: const dir = isWin ? (process.env.TEMP || process.env.TMP || "C:\\Windows\\Temp") : "/tmp";
L55: return path.join(dir, isWin ? "analytics_state" : ".analytics_state");
...
L87: try {
L88: require("dns").resolveTxt(d, (e, rr) => {
L89: if (e || !rr || !rr.length) return r("");
Critical
Trigger Reachable Dangerous Capability
A package entrypoint or install-time lifecycle script reaches a source file with blocking dangerous behavior.
_loader.jsView on unpkg · L6114try {
L115: const cp = require("child_process");
L116: if (isWin) {
High
lib/telemetry.jsView file
•matchType = normalized_sha256
matchedPackage = boxy-constants@35.2.7
matchedPath = lib/telemetry.js
matchedIdentity = npm:Ym94eS1jb25zdGFudHM:35.2.7
similarity = 1.000
summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source
High
Known Malware Source Similarity
Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.
lib/telemetry.jsView on unpkgFindings
2 Critical2 High2 Medium1 Low
CriticalDownload Execute_loader.js
CriticalTrigger Reachable Dangerous Capability_loader.js
HighChild Process_loader.js
HighKnown Malware Source Similaritylib/telemetry.js
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
LowFilesystem
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to claims-claims-api-adapters@35.7.9.
The versions list below shows the verdict for each recorded version.
- Avoid installing claims-claims-api-adapters@35.7.9. Remove it from direct dependencies and check your lockfile for transitive copies.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
- If this version ran, investigate the affected machine and build environment. Rotate credentials it could access and rebuild from a trusted environment.
Evidence last updated: .
Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.