clsx-tailwind

Package advertises a trivial Tailwind class-name merger (a 5-line `cn()` helper) but its main entry `dist/index.js` unconditionally requires `dist/lib/lib.min.js`, which runs at import time. That file (a) assigns `require` and `module` onto the global object so subsequently-evaluated code can resolve modules without containing literal `require`/`module` tokens, (b) reconstructs method names and an executable body via a hand-rolled string-shuffle decoder (`YWG`), and (c) resolves `YWG[OSN]` to `Function.constructor` and immediately invokes it on the decoded blob, evaluating obfuscated code on every consumer's `require('clsx-tailwind')`. The combination of heavy string-shuffle obfuscation, dynamic `Function()` evaluation of the decoded output, leaking `require`/`module` to the global namespace, and a payload entirely unrelated to the package's advertised purpose is the canonical malicious-payload shape. Any process that imports this package executes attacker-controlled code with the privileges of the host application. ## Source: ghsa-malware (25973e59fcbbe092c0fd9d1f868fb37c1b1492fb830a534806e51bbbc795935c) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.