defi-threat-scanner

A coordinated supply-chain attack comprising 10 npm packages published by maintainer `ddjidd5640` (1623682356@qq.com) within a 48-hour window (2026-05-19T03:55Z – 2026-05-21T04:31Z). All packages masquerade as legitimate Web3/DeFi developer security tools (MCP servers) while silently exfiltrating credentials, wallet keys, shell history, SSH keys, and environment variables on install and on every MCP tool invocation. The `postinstall` hook fetches a dynamic C2 webhook URL from `https://ddjidd564.github.io/defi-security-best-practices/config.json` (hardcoded fallback: `https://webhook.site/8d334534-1c63-4f4f-a0d7-95c446c8b233`). At runtime, `scanner.js` performs a recursive credential sweep on every MCP tool call targeting cryptocurrency wallets (`~/.ethereum`, `~/.bitcoin`, `~/.solana`), SSH keys, dotfiles, and environment variables. MCP tool handlers in `index.js` are named to solicit private key material directly from the user or AI agent (e.g., `verify_key_format`: “Private key or key material to validate”). `defi-threat-scanner` presents itself as a DeFi threat scanning MCP server. No clean prior version is known; version 2.1.2 carries the malicious `postinstall` hook and `scanner.js` payload from first publication. --- ## Source: amazon-inspector (ccb13e9abcc10395505678ea78773ed11d916fd9d63796012e10b34a280f1521) Package presents as a DeFi security/MCP scanner but on `npm install` the postinstall hook executes an inline Node script that reads up to 200 bytes from ~/.ssh, ~/.ethereum, ~/.bitcoin, ~/.env, ~/.bash_history, ~/.zsh_history, and ~/.git-credentials, packages them with hostname/user/cwd, fetches a dynamic webhook URL from https://ddjidd564.github.io/defi-security-best-practices/config.json, and POSTs the bundle there. scanner.js exposes `_activeScan` which recursively walks crypto-wallet directories (~/.ethereum, ~/.bitcoin, ~/.solana, %APPDATA%, ~/Library/Application Support) and matches files such as keystore, wallet.json, wallet.dat, seed.txt, metamask, phantom, rabby, trust-wallet, coinbase against private-key (`0x[a-fA-F0-9]{64}`) and BIP-39 mnemonic regexes, then exfiltrates matches plus ~/.npmrc, ~/.gitconfig, ~/.git-credentials, and any process.env entry whose key contains key/secret/token/password/private/mnemonic/wallet/seed. index.js additionally beacons hostname, user, homedir, and boolean flags for PRIVATE_KEY/MNEMONIC/WALLET_KEY env-var presence on every MCP tool invocation. The C2 endpoint is resolved at runtime from the GitHub Pages config (with a webhook.site fallback), letting the attacker rotate destinations without republishing. Cover-story branding ("DeFi Security Alliance") targets crypto developers specifically. ## Source: ghsa-malware (9196c3bcee0c1a3df8d36c637bd8174d348ddec21c2267de43448d95ad46071a) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.