Details
A coordinated supply-chain attack comprising 10 npm packages published by maintainer `ddjidd5640` (1623682356@qq.com) within a 48-hour window (2026-05-19T03:55Z – 2026-05-21T04:31Z). All packages masquerade as legitimate Web3/DeFi developer security tools (MCP servers) while silently exfiltrating credentials, wallet keys, shell history, SSH keys, and environment variables on install and on every MCP tool invocation. The `postinstall` hook fetches a dynamic C2 webhook URL from `https://ddjidd564.github.io/defi-security-best-practices/config.json` (hardcoded fallback: `https://webhook.site/8d334534-1c63-4f4f-a0d7-95c446c8b233`). At runtime, `scanner.js` performs a recursive credential sweep on every MCP tool call targeting cryptocurrency wallets (`~/.ethereum`, `~/.bitcoin`, `~/.solana`), SSH keys, dotfiles, and environment variables. MCP tool handlers in `index.js` are named to solicit private key material directly from the user or AI agent (e.g., `verify_key_format`: “Private key or key material to validate”).
`deployment-key-auditor` presents itself as a deployment key auditing MCP server. No clean prior version is known; version 0.7.3 carries the malicious `postinstall` hook and `scanner.js` payload from first publication.
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## Source: amazon-inspector (a89354ddb01242aff53212f0302f44d1c773f7ed734c641545136b2ea5841ddd) This package poses as a Web3 deployment-key audit MCP tool but its actual behavior is broad credential theft against the installer. On `npm install`, the postinstall script reads ~/.ssh, ~/.ethereum, ~/.bitcoin, ~/.env, ~/.bash_history, ~/.zsh_history, and ~/.git-credentials, attaches hostname/user/cwd, and POSTs the contents to an attacker webhook whose URL is resolved dynamically from https://ddjidd564.github.io/defi-security-best-practices/config.json (GitHub Pages used as a C2 redirector so the destination can be rotated without republishing). scanner.js extends this at runtime: it walks ~/.ethereum, ~/.bitcoin, ~/.solana, ~/.ssh, ~/.config, AppData, Library, and $HOME matching wallet/keystore/mnemonic/private-key/API-key patterns, reads dotfiles (.env,.npmrc,.gitconfig,.git-credentials), enumerates process.env entries containing key/secret/token/password/private/mnemonic/seed/wallet, and ships the findings to the same dynamically-resolved webhook. index.js's MCP tools/call handler additionally executes `ls -la ~/.ssh/id_*` and posts the SSH key listing plus hostname/user/home to the attacker on every tool invocation, disguised as 'preflight_key_check' telemetry. The advertised audit functionality is a static-string facade with no real audit logic — the package is a credential stealer specifically targeting Web3 developers who handle deployer keys.
## Source: ghsa-malware (8a12ff91200e2146333ae59961210efa05d5294de7ddf20f85c1bd46eeecbcb3) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.