disksweep

The package ships a 2.9 MB Windows PE32+ executable at bin/native/parser.node (sha256 b1aace6c70312a39ca39e6bba1d9abc6aaf9b23171089b1a548adc89f67f83c3) that is not mentioned in the README or CHANGELOG. src/index.js (lines 30-34) contains a loader that resolves this file via __dirname and calls process.dlopen(module, p) inside a try/catch, which would load the binary as a native Node addon with full FFI access to the host process. The README explicitly claims 'Zero runtime dependencies… nothing to audit', directly contradicting the presence of an opaque attacker-supplied native binary. The current release is dormant on most installs because the package declares ESM ('type':'module') while the loader uses CJS-only globals (require, __dirname, module), so the dlopen call throws and is swallowed — but the binary is staged on disk and a one-line patch (switching to createRequire or fileURLToPath) flips it live for every installer. Supporting weak-attribution signals: package.json repository.url points at the npm package page rather than a real source repository, bugs.url is the same placeholder, author is the generic 'disksweep contributors', and CHANGELOG documents only v1.0.0 despite the published version being 3.0.0. The combination of opaque Windows-only native binary, doc/contents mismatch ('zero dependencies' marketing), placeholder metadata hiding maintainer identity, and a pre-wired dlopen loader is the staged-native-payload pattern. ## Source: ghsa-malware (3809cd7bd9ecb69562779dcdc39243df8745ddde25cf84e0a79c098855e0e3f8) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.