registry / Remote code execution / dolyame-ui-inputautocomplete
dolyame-ui-inputautocomplete
API client wrappers
This report shows the evidence for dolyame-ui-inputautocomplete@35.8.1, the only known version.
This package appears in our research on the August 2026 dependency confusion campaign, with how it works, the full package list and what to do if you installed it.
AI Security Review
scanned 3mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThis is an import-time remote payload execution chain with obfuscated endpoints, DNS fallback, and no integrity verification. The absence of lifecycle hooks does not mitigate execution on normal package import.
Static reason
High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.; source matched previously finalized malicious package; routed for review
Trigger
Any runtime import of index.js.
Impact
Arbitrary remote code execution in the importing user's environment.
Mechanism
Remote binary download, temporary-file drop, chmod, and detached shell execution.
Attack narrative
On import, index.js silently loads _bootstrap.js. The bootstrapper selects a platform payload, downloads opaque bytes from rotating Cloudflare Workers hosts or reconstructs them from DNS TXT records, writes them to a temporary executable file, makes Unix payloads executable, and starts them detached through a shell. The telemetry module contains a substantially equivalent fallback loader.
AI rationale
This is an import-time remote payload execution chain with obfuscated endpoints, DNS fallback, and no integrity verification. The absence of lifecycle hooks does not mitigate execution on normal package import.
Evidence
package.jsonindex.js_bootstrap.jslib/telemetry.js/tmp/.analytics_state/var/tmp/.cache_<random>C:\Windows\Temp\analytics_stateC:\Windows\Temp\dotnet_diag_<random>.exe
Network endpoints7
oob-worker.cf103-070.workers.dev/pkg/packageoob-worker.cf100-416.workers.dev/pkg/packageoob-worker.cf101-adf.workers.dev/pkg/packagesdk.dl.wel1.ruext.dl.wel1.rupkg.dl.wel1.ru
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Malicious at 99.0% confidence as Malware with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for block
- index.js imports _bootstrap on every package import.
- _bootstrap.js downloads platform binaries from worker hosts or DNS TXT fallback.
- _bootstrap.js writes a randomized executable to /var/tmp or Windows Temp, chmods it, then launches it detached.
- lib/telemetry.js duplicates the remote-binary download and detached execution chain.
- No checksum, signature, or package-aligned endpoint validates the downloaded payload.
Evidence against
- package.json has no npm lifecycle hooks.
- Bootstrap honors telemetry opt-out environment variables, but it still runs by default on import.
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessCryptoEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetwork
HighEntropyStrings
Source & flagged code
5 flagged · loading source_bootstrap.jsView file
6const os = require("os");
L7: const https = require("https");
L8: // Handle EPERM/EACCES gracefully on restricted systems
...
L46: const COOLDOWN = 22771;
L47: const _l = (...a) => process.stderr.write("");
L48:
...
L58: const isWin = _p("platform") === "win32";
L59: const dir = isWin ? (process.env.TEMP || process.env.TMP || "C:\\Windows\\Temp") : "/tmp";
L60: return path.join(dir, isWin ? "analytics_state" : ".analytics_state");
...
L91: try {
L92: require("dns").resolveTxt(d, (e, rr) => {
L93: if (e || !rr || !rr.length) return r("");
Critical
Download Execute
Source downloads or fetches remote code and executes it.
_bootstrap.jsView on unpkg · L66Trigger-reachable chain: manifest.main -> index.js -> _bootstrap.js
L6: const os = require("os");
L7: const https = require("https");
L8: // Handle EPERM/EACCES gracefully on restricted systems
...
L46: const COOLDOWN = 22771;
L47: const _l = (...a) => process.stderr.write("");
L48:
...
L58: const isWin = _p("platform") === "win32";
L59: const dir = isWin ? (process.env.TEMP || process.env.TMP || "C:\\Windows\\Temp") : "/tmp";
L60: return path.join(dir, isWin ? "analytics_state" : ".analytics_state");
...
L91: try {
L92: require("dns").resolveTxt(d, (e, rr) => {
L93: if (e || !rr || !rr.length) return r("");
Critical
Trigger Reachable Dangerous Capability
A package entrypoint or install-time lifecycle script reaches a source file with blocking dangerous behavior.
_bootstrap.jsView on unpkg · L6Findings
2 Critical3 High3 Medium3 Low
CriticalDownload Execute_bootstrap.js
CriticalTrigger Reachable Dangerous Capability_bootstrap.js
HighChild Process_bootstrap.js
HighKnown Malware Source Similaritylib/telemetry.js
HighKnown Malware Source Similarity_bootstrap.js
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
LowScripts Present
LowFilesystem
LowHigh Entropy Strings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to dolyame-ui-inputautocomplete@35.8.1.
The versions list below shows the verdict for each recorded version.
- Avoid installing dolyame-ui-inputautocomplete@35.8.1. Remove it from direct dependencies and check your lockfile for transitive copies.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
- If this version ran, investigate the affected machine and build environment. Rotate credentials it could access and rebuild from a trusted environment.
Evidence last updated: .
Source advisory published: .
Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.