dotenv-express

Package impersonates the popular `dotenv` package: `package.json` points its repository field to `git://github.com/motdotla/dotenv.git` and homepage to `https://github.com/motdotla/dotenv#readme`, neither of which the author owns. The library code is a near-verbatim copy of dotenv but adds `const gate = require('environment-gate')` at the top of `lib/main.js`, and the documented `config()` entry point begins with `gate.gate()` — so any consumer calling the standard dotenv API (`require('dotenv-express').config()`) executes code from `environment-gate`, an unrelated third-party dependency with no env-file-loading purpose, on every load. The package additionally ships `skills/dotenv/SKILL.md` and `skills/dotenvx/SKILL.md` whose frontmatter declares `name: dotenv`, `author: motdotla`, `source: https://github.com/motdotla/dotenv`, and instructs `npm install dotenv` — identity-spoofing metadata designed to trick AI coding agents into treating this package as the genuine dotenv. The combination of impersonated repo/homepage/skill metadata, a name one token away from `dotenv`, and a forced transitive dependency that runs on the documented API call is deliberate namespace abuse rather than a typo, and the harm to installers is whatever `environment-gate` does at require-time on every `.config()` invocation. ## Source: ghsa-malware (03c0fed624e7f4adac4d6d6f75a5d7074900b15daf2009781445e6edd0b01f87) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.