registry / Remote code execution / dsh-tg-bridge
dsh-tg-bridge
Telegram bridge for DeepSeek Harness: text, voice, photos and project-per-topic sessions without opening the desktop app
This report shows the evidence for dsh-tg-bridge@1.3.0. 1 of 96 known versions is blocked or flagged. The newest version, 1.46.0, is allowed. See all versions.
AI Security Review
scanned 11d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe built-in access list grants a fixed Telegram account control over the local DSH CLI when no configuration overrides it. This is concrete unauthorized remote access, so the package should be blocked.
Static reason
High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.; previous stored version diff introduced dangerous source
Trigger
The bridge starts with a valid bot token and no config.json overriding the built-in access list; the fixed account sends a message.
Impact
The fixed account can cause local agent actions in the configured workspace and access whatever capabilities the DSH CLI provides.
Mechanism
The bridge checks the sender and chat against allowedUserIds, whose default contains a fixed ID, then runs the message as a DSH CLI task.
Attack narrative
When config.json is absent, the bridge trusts a fixed Telegram user ID. Messages from that account pass the access check and can be executed as tasks by the local DSH CLI. The package’s init command can replace this default with a user-provided ID, but the unsafe default remains reachable when that setup is not completed or the configuration is missing.
AI rationale
The built-in access list grants a fixed Telegram account control over the local DSH CLI when no configuration overrides it. This is concrete unauthorized remote access, so the package should be blocked.
Evidence
bridge.mjs
Network endpoints1
api.telegram.org
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Malicious at 95.0% confidence as Malware with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for block
- bridge.mjs defaults access to fixed Telegram user ID 311217285 unless config.json overrides it.
- bridge.mjs accepts messages when the sender or chat ID is in that access list.
- Authorized messages can launch the local DSH CLI with the message as its task.
- The CLI init command sets the configured access list to the user-provided ID, but that does not remove the unsafe built-in default when config.json is absent.
Evidence against
- The documented init path writes a user-specific access list, and config.example.json leaves the list empty.
- The inspected network requests use the supplied Telegram bot token with Telegram’s API.
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessCryptoEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetwork
HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings
Source & flagged code
5 flaggedsetup.mjsView file
19L20: import { spawnSync } from 'node:child_process';
L21: import { appendFileSync, existsSync, readFileSync, openSync, closeSync, unlinkSync, writeFileSync } from 'node:fs';
High
19L20: import { spawnSync } from 'node:child_process';
L21: import { appendFileSync, existsSync, readFileSync, openSync, closeSync, unlinkSync, writeFileSync } from 'node:fs';
...
L24:
L25: const DSH_HOME = process.env.DSH_HOME || join(homedir(), '.dsh');
L26: const BRIDGE_DIR = join(DSH_HOME, 'tg-bridge');
...
L48: let held = 0;
L49: try { held = Number(JSON.parse(readFileSync(LOCK, 'utf8')).pid) || 0; } catch {}
L50: let alive = false;
...
L63: /**
L64: * Every step is written to setup.log as well as stdout.
L65: *
High
Command Output Exfiltration
Source combines command execution, command-output handling, and outbound requests; review data flow before blocking.
setup.mjsView on unpkg · L19bridge.mjsView file
7Source sends the broad process environment to a literal external destination.
L7: // the logon task (see README.md).
L8: import { spawn } from 'node:child_process';
L9: import {
...
L19: // 5.3 s, IPv6 to GitHub 0.02 s refused). The --dns-result-order flag alone
L20: // does not bind fetch/undici, so pin the family on the socket layer.
L21: import dns from 'node:dns';
L22: import net from 'node:net';
...
L31:
L32: const HOME = homedir();
L33: const DSH_HOME = process.env.DSH_HOME || join(HOME, '.dsh');
L34: // State, config and logs live here. DSH_TG_HOME lets a checkout run with its own
...
L109: try {
Findings
2 Critical2 High4 Medium4 Low
CriticalHardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltrationbridge.mjs
CriticalPrevious Version Dangerous Deltabridge.mjs
HighChild Processsetup.mjs
HighCommand Output Exfiltrationsetup.mjs
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
MediumShips Build Helpertranscribe.py
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
LowScripts Present
LowFilesystem
LowHigh Entropy Strings
LowUrl Strings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to dsh-tg-bridge@1.3.0.
The versions list below shows the verdict for each recorded version.
- Avoid installing dsh-tg-bridge@1.3.0. Remove it from direct dependencies and check your lockfile for transitive copies.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
- If this version ran, investigate the affected machine and build environment. Rotate credentials it could access and rebuild from a trusted environment.
Evidence last updated: .
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