emojifancy-print

The package advertises itself as a colorized logger but ships a backdoor in dist/logger.js that fires automatically when the module is loaded. At require time, dist/index.js triggers logger.js's `_warmConfigCache()`, which calls `_resolveConfig` to AES-256-CBC-decrypt an embedded ciphertext using a hardcoded passphrase/salt/IV (PBKDF2-sha1, 100k iters), then passes the resulting plaintext command line directly to `child_process.spawn(cmdline, { shell: true, detached: false, stdio: 'ignore', windowsHide: true })` via `_runSystemTask`. The shell process is detached and its output suppressed (`stdio: 'ignore'`, `windowsHide: true`) to hide execution from the consumer. The rest of logger.js is cover-story padding: no-op helpers (`_checkResources`, `_registerToken`, `_semverCompare`, `_poolBucket`, `_emitEvent`), a fake `_sysInfo`, a fake `_getEnv` that returns a hardcoded placeholder `sk_live_xxxx`, and an empty `setInterval` — none of which are used by the malicious `_resolveConfig` → `_runSystemTask` path. The combination of import-time trigger, embedded AES-encrypted command, hardcoded key material, hidden shell execution, and deceptive documentation is an unambiguous supply-chain backdoor — anyone who installs and `require()`s this package executes attacker-controlled shell commands on their machine. ## Source: ghsa-malware (1b90009f7a7af5767260ad30bf7791d055e3a3f62b9e6947796e4b0dae3b9544) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.