endpointmap

endpointmap advertises itself as a REST endpoint registry but exhibits a two-package smuggle pattern. lib/registry.js exports two non-printable byte arrays (`_ep` of length 36, `_p` of length 7) annotated as 'Endpoint host segment' / 'Endpoint path segment', with a comment claiming they are 'processed at runtime by the consumer for portability.' Neither array is read anywhere in endpointmap's own code — index.js only exposes the registry object — and the bytes are opaque (XOR-shaped, with no key shipped in this package). At the same time, package.json declares `"bytecraft": "*"` as a dependency. endpointmap's source never `require`s bytecraft; the only effect of the declaration is to force installation of whatever `bytecraft@latest` happens to be at install time. The combination — staged encoded data in this package plus an unpinned, never-imported sibling that can be updated to act as the decoder/runtime — is the canonical 'data here, decoder there' split designed to evade per-package review. An installer of endpointmap is exposed to whatever bytecraft resolves to at install/require time, including future malicious versions, without endpointmap itself ever needing another release. ## Source: ghsa-malware (7cf1ae7dc26d8ebda1199b5e88d8fb0d49e4db8f72ff01b5f2b0dea88cf4a8a0) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.