flow-lending

Sentinel-high (9.9.9) dependency-confusion squat of an internal Cardano/DeFi lending pkg. preinstall `node index.js || true` auto-execs a credential exfil: harvests env secrets (mnemonic/private key/token/blockfrost API key) and POSTs to raw attacker C2 2.25.140.71:8443/surflending/npm-confusion. 2-pkg campaign (flow-lending + surf-lending). c913 + c252. --- ## Source: amazon-inspector (244fb3d5df39fbdba24f9a22b86d0bca43667f3376a9529d5cc84e411f11a28f) On `npm install`, the package's preinstall lifecycle hook executes index.js, which collects host identity (hostname, username, cwd) and enumerates process.env, filtering keys against the regex /key|seed|secret|token|private|mnemonic|password|blockfrost|redis|telegram|batcher/i. The collected JSON is POSTed over HTTPS to a hardcoded bare IP destination (https://2.25.140.71:8443/surflending/npm-confusion). The package provides no legitimate functionality; the path component 'surflending/npm-confusion' and the 9.9.9 version (a version-bump pattern used to win dependency-confusion resolution) indicate a directed dependency-confusion attack against an internal Cardano/SundaeSwap-related package name. Any installer with wallet-related secrets in environment variables (mnemonics, private keys, blockfrost tokens, telegram bot tokens, redis credentials, batcher keys) loses them at install time. ## Source: ghsa-malware (31f3b9a8a1c9a108f544556d9f0ed2d1642e847bfe36ba050aab0011fb9d731d) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.