flow-lending-sdk

Continuation of the flow/surf-lending DeFi cred-exfil campaign (c1655). Sentinel-9.9.9 depconf squat; preinstall `node index.js || true` exfils env secrets (mnemonic/private-key/blockfrost) to raw C2 2.25.140.71:8443/surflending/npm-confusion (same C2). Companions bodega-sdk/flowdefi verified identical. No-renotify. --- ## Source: amazon-inspector (faf2e80d03da797a24237629d2c2bc87fa936f996c4de55bcd938283b1a617b9) flow-lending-sdk@9.9.9 declares `preinstall: node index.js || true` in package.json, causing index.js to execute automatically on `npm install`. The script collects host identity (hostname, username, cwd) and iterates `process.env`, filtering for keys matching /key|seed|secret|token|private|mnemonic|password|blockfrost|redis|telegram|batcher/i — i.e., wallet seed phrases, private keys, API tokens, and infrastructure credentials. The collected JSON is HTTPS-POSTed to the bare IP `2.25.140.71:8443` at path `/surflending/npm-confusion`. The package ships no real SDK functionality (description is the placeholder `flow-lending-sdk SDK`, version is `9.9.9`), and the exfil URL path explicitly names this as a dependency-confusion attack — almost certainly targeting developers of Cardano/Flow lending infrastructure who expect a private internal package of this name. ## Source: ghsa-malware (0c53f2d309499f7c77e2fc1024ece82ca775f13741abacdcaf4ede50fa6c8e39) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.