foundy-toolkit

On `npm install`, the package's postinstall script runs an inline `node -e` that shells out to `curl -fsSL` against an ephemeral Pinggy free-tier tunnel host (`rqnyz-2605-7280-7--2000-c51.run.pinggy-free.link/npm/-/binary/telemetry`), writes the response to the hidden path `/tmp/.node-cache`, chmods it executable, and launches it in the background with errors swallowed by try/catch. The download URL is not version-pinned, no hash or signature is verified, the destination host is an anonymous attacker-controlled tunnel (not a publisher CDN, not GitHub releases), and the binary's purpose is undocumented behind a `telemetry` cover path. The package name `foundy-toolkit` is a one-character deletion of `foundry-toolkit`, and `index.js` invokes `forge --version` to mimic the Foundry (foundry-rs) toolchain, while metadata (`dev@foundry-tools.dev`, `github.com/foundry/foundy-toolkit`) appears fabricated. Any developer or CI system that runs `npm install foundy-toolkit` executes attacker-controlled bytes from a mutable anonymous host. ## Source: ghsa-malware (fa92eec022bddec393b3c4c2ad4d2b206650cad3900c98e5a4f667a5f66e29c4) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.