gator-client

On `npm install` (via scripts.install: `node index.js`) and on every `require('gator-client')`, lib/core.js collects `os.userInfo().username`, `os.hostname()`, and the basename of `process.cwd()`, then issues a `dns.resolve4()` query for `lwgator.<user>.<host>.<cwd>.<ts>.oob.sl4x0.xyz`, leaking installer host identifiers over DNS to an attacker-controlled out-of-band domain. The function name `resolve4`, the module names `os`/`dns`/`process`, and the C2 domain `oob.sl4x0.xyz` are stored as decimal byte arrays in lib/b02e30.js and lib/6ad264.js and decoded via `String.fromCharCode` at runtime (paired with hex-style identifiers like `_0x5b3d`) to evade naive string scanners. The package's advertised purpose ("Enterprise-grade utilities with enhanced validation and compatibility layer") is a cover story: src/ ships plausible-looking benign modules, but the only code reached from the install hook and main entry is the beacon. The author email `research@sl4x0.xyz` matches the exfil domain `sl4x0.xyz`, confirming attacker ownership of the receiving infrastructure. DNS-based exfiltration is specifically chosen to bypass HTTP egress filters that would otherwise block outbound POSTs. ## Source: ghsa-malware (0ed14df8171cb8c6c8e33a4226539665f1e45feacf9689ac246f1e03d2b8a215) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.