google-storage-cloud

Dependency confusion and typosquatting campaign by threat actor "saif777". Packages use inflated version numbers (9999.9999.9999, 9999.9999.10000, 50.50.50, 7.66.5) to win version resolution in environments with private registries. All active packages execute a postinstall hook ("node index.js") that collects a system fingerprint — public IP (via api.ipify.org), username, hostname, CPU model, RAM, working directory, OS platform — and exfiltrates it as a Discord embed to a shared webhook (base64-obfuscated in source). Payloads include sandbox/bot detection: machines with ≤1 CPU or <2 GB RAM are flagged as sandbox/CI; real machines trigger a green embed. Typosquats the official @google-cloud/storage package. After exfiltrating system data the payload attempts to silently proxy to the legitimate @google-cloud/storage library (if installed) to avoid detection and maintain normal application behaviour. --- ## Source: amazon-inspector (3165058ca43e5f61b655365b7e28c0c51d2893719df07768f07571691cc66ce6) The package google-storage-cloud was found to contain malicious code. ## Source: ghsa-malware (ba2c5a4da41b19b5e8f9f9e442d425a3d5dd6b5af23d103bb2448fd2298ce0bc) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.