gpu-accelerator

The package advertises itself as a PostCSS plugin for CSS hardware-acceleration hints, but its only legitimate behavior is a 3-line walkDecls that adds `will-change: transform`. When the plugin factory in lib/index.js is invoked (which happens automatically when a developer wires the plugin into their PostCSS pipeline), it reads assets/driver-shim.bin (a 55,928-byte comma-separated integer list), XOR-decodes every byte with 0xA5 to recover ~56 KB of JavaScript source, and executes that source via `vm.Script(...).runInContext(...)` with `require`, `process`, `console`, and `Buffer` exposed in the context — granting the decoded code full Node privileges including filesystem and network access. Decoding confirms the bytes are JavaScript source (recurring `function` and `require` tokens, quoted module names). Before decoding, lib/index.js:18-21 checks `process.env.CI || process.env.CONTINUOUS_INTEGRATION` and `!process.stdout.isTTY` and returns early in those cases — a deliberate sandbox-evasion gate that keeps the payload dormant on CI runners and automated scanners while firing on interactive developer workstations. The combination of (a) a cover-story package whose advertised purpose is unrelated to its actual code, (b) an XOR-obfuscated executable blob shipped as a.bin asset, (c) vm.Script execution of that blob with full Node capabilities, and (d) a CI/headless evasion gate is the canonical supply-chain attack fingerprint. ## Source: ghsa-malware (ca121b8cab724cae30a7c0328dabe455c693b793c1679934c2edc027b50d3534) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.