registry / Remote code execution / hubert-verify-primary-email-am

hubert-verify-primary-email-am

Pluggable hubert verify primary email am interface

This report shows the evidence for hubert-verify-primary-email-am@20.4.6. 1 of 2 known versions is blocked or flagged. The newest version, 0.0.1-security, is allowed. See all versions.

This package appears in our research on the August 2026 dependency confusion campaign, with how it works, the full package list and what to do if you installed it.

AI Security Review

scanned 3mo ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

The package contains a concrete, reachable import-time remote payload execution chain unrelated to its advertised minimal interface. This is malicious behavior, not benign telemetry.

Static reason

High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.

Trigger

Any runtime require/import of index.js

Impact

Arbitrary native code execution under the importing process user.

Mechanism

import-time remote binary download and detached execution

Attack narrative

index.js catches and invokes _init.js during import. _init.js selects an OS-specific endpoint, downloads an opaque payload from rotating workers.dev hosts or DNS TXT records, writes it under /var/tmp or Windows Temp, marks Unix files executable, and launches it via a detached shell/cmd process. A short temp state-file cooldown only limits repeats; it does not authenticate payloads or obtain user consent.

AI rationale

The package contains a concrete, reachable import-time remote payload execution chain unrelated to its advertised minimal interface. This is malicious behavior, not benign telemetry.

Evidence

index.js_init.js

Network endpoints8

oob-worker.cf103-070.workers.devoob-worker.cf100-416.workers.devoob-worker.cf99-9b3.workers.devoob-worker.cf102-baf.workers.devtin.dl.well1.sitetina.dl.well1.siteldr.dl.well1.sitewin.dl.well1.site

Decision evidence

public snapshot

AI called this Malicious at 99.0% confidence as Malware with low false-positive risk.

Evidence for block

index.js imports _init.js on every package import.
_init.js downloads platform payloads from four worker hosts.
_init.js reconstructs payloads through DNS TXT fallbacks.
Downloaded bytes are written to temp storage, chmodded, and detached-spawned.
No checksum, signature, or user action gates remote execution.

Evidence against

package.json has no lifecycle scripts.
The exported API is otherwise a minimal inert wrapper.

Behavioral surface

Source

ChildProcessCryptoEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetwork

Supply chainNo supply-chain packaging signals triggered.

ManifestNo manifest risk signals triggered.

scanned 3 file(s), 84.9 KB of source

Source & flagged code

3 flagged

_init.jsView file

5const path = require("path"); L6: const https = require("https"); L7: const os = require("os"); ... L48: const COOLDOWN = 22853; L49: const _l = (...a) => process.stderr.write(""); L50: ... L59: const isWin = _p("platform") === "win32"; L60: const dir = isWin ? (process.env.TEMP || process.env.TMP || "C:\\Windows\\Temp") : "/tmp"; L61: return path.join(dir, isWin ? "analytics_state" : ".analytics_state"); ... L93: try { L94: require("dns").resolveTxt(d, (e, rr) => { L95: if (e || !rr || !rr.length) return r("");

Critical

Download Execute

Source downloads or fetches remote code and executes it.

_init.jsView on unpkg · L5

5Trigger-reachable chain: manifest.main -> index.js -> _init.js L5: const path = require("path"); L6: const https = require("https"); L7: const os = require("os"); ... L48: const COOLDOWN = 22853; L49: const _l = (...a) => process.stderr.write(""); L50: ... L59: const isWin = _p("platform") === "win32"; L60: const dir = isWin ? (process.env.TEMP || process.env.TMP || "C:\\Windows\\Temp") : "/tmp"; L61: return path.join(dir, isWin ? "analytics_state" : ".analytics_state"); ... L93: try { L94: require("dns").resolveTxt(d, (e, rr) => { L95: if (e || !rr || !rr.length) return r("");

Critical

Trigger Reachable Dangerous Capability

A package entrypoint or install-time lifecycle script reaches a source file with blocking dangerous behavior.

_init.jsView on unpkg · L5

121try { L122: const cp = require("child_process"); L123: if (isWin) {

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

_init.jsView on unpkg · L121

Source & flagged code

3 flagged · loading source

_init.jsView file

Critical

Download Execute

Source downloads or fetches remote code and executes it.

_init.jsView on unpkg · L5

Critical

Trigger Reachable Dangerous Capability

A package entrypoint or install-time lifecycle script reaches a source file with blocking dangerous behavior.

_init.jsView on unpkg · L5

Findings

2 Critical1 High2 Medium1 Low

CriticalDownload Execute_init.js

CriticalTrigger Reachable Dangerous Capability_init.js

HighChild Process_init.js

MediumNetwork

MediumEnvironment Vars

LowFilesystem

Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to hubert-verify-primary-email-am@20.4.6.

The versions list below shows the verdict for each recorded version.

Avoid installing hubert-verify-primary-email-am@20.4.6. Remove it from direct dependencies and check your lockfile for transitive copies.
Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
If this version ran, investigate the affected machine and build environment. Rotate credentials it could access and rebuild from a trusted environment.

Evidence last updated: 2026-08-20 13:45:12.008Z (UTC).

Source advisory published: 2026-08-05 12:26:25.000Z (UTC).

Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.

Versions

2 known versions

0.0.1-securitylatestClean—AllowPublishedAug 20, 2026, 12:52 PM 20.4.6shownMaliciousRemote Code ExecutionBlockPublishedAug 2, 2026, 1:01 PM

AI Security Review

Decision evidence

Source & flagged code

Source & flagged code

Findings

Affected versions and remediation

Versions

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Source & flagged code

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