ipungg-baileys@1.0.2
WhatsApp Web API Library - Ipung Baileys with Auto Channel Follow
This package appears in our research on the malicious Baileys forks, with how it works, the full package list and what to do if you installed it.
AI Security Review
scanned 7d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiSource inspection confirms an automatic account action: the normal socket constructor follows a fixed publisher-selected newsletter. This is concrete unauthorized account mutation, so publication should be blocked.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The socket sends a follow action for a fixed newsletter ID through the WhatsApp network query path.
- The follow runs automatically when the newsletter socket is created, with startup and connection timers and retries.
- The package’s public socket entrypoint reaches the newsletter socket through the normal constructor chain.
Source & flagged code
6 flagged · loading sourcePackage defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkgA bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review.
WAProto/index.jsView on unpkgPackage contains source files above the normal full-analysis size ceiling.
WAProto/index.jsView on unpkgFindings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to ipungg-baileys@1.0.2.
See all versions of ipungg-baileys for other recorded verdicts.
- Avoid installing ipungg-baileys@1.0.2. Remove it from direct dependencies and check your lockfile for transitive copies.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
- If this version ran, investigate the affected machine and build environment. Rotate credentials it could access and rebuild from a trusted environment.
Evidence last updated: .
Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.