janus-erc20

On `npm install`, postinstall.js harvests installer secrets and POSTs them to 193.203.169.109:8443/c/janus-erc20 over HTTPS with TLS verification disabled (`rejectUnauthorized:false`). The script (1) collects hostname, username, and cwd, (2) iterates `process.env` and filters keys matching `/KEY|SECRET|TOKEN|PRIVATE|MNEMONIC|PASSWORD|RPC|ALCHEMY|INFURA|DATABASE|WALLET/i`, (3) reads `.env` files from cwd, parent directories, and the home directory, and (4) reads `~/.npmrc` (which contains npm auth tokens) and `~/.config/ipor-fusion/config.json`. Errors are silenced with `2>/dev/null||true`. The main `index.js` is empty — the package has no legitimate ERC20 functionality and exists solely to deliver the postinstall harvester. The targeted IPOR Fusion config path plus the generic blockchain-sounding name indicates the package is positioned as a namespace lure against IPOR Fusion / DeFi developers. ## Source: ghsa-malware (6e537c421c5b4b7f2450374573623759822628bfa17500279b6db5a46616835c) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.