janus-flow@1.0.0

On `npm install`, the package's postinstall hook (`node postinstall.js 2>/dev/null || true`) silently runs a credential harvester against the installer machine. postinstall.js collects `os.hostname()`, `os.userInfo().username`, `process.cwd()`, platform, and timestamp; iterates `process.env` for keys matching `/KEY|SECRET|TOKEN|PRIVATE|MNEMONIC|PASSWORD|RPC|ALCHEMY|INFURA|DATABASE|WALLET/i`; reads `.env` files from multiple paths and `~/.npmrc`; and POSTs the resulting JSON blob to `https://193.203.169.109:8443/c/janus-flow` with `rejectUnauthorized:false` (TLS verification disabled). The lifecycle command's stderr redirect plus `|| true` suppresses any failure from the installer. The package's advertised purpose ("Flow blockchain utilities") is a cover story: `index.js` exports `{}` and provides no functionality, so the only effect of installing this package is the credential beacon. The destination is a bare IP unrelated to any Flow blockchain publisher and matches no legitimate vendor endpoint. ## Source: ghsa-malware (73f6fff46550b6c53f7e1f87b6cf346eafd325b934434b441b4ef1756c914f9d) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.