js-client-node

package.json declares a postinstall hook (`node dist/postinstall.js`) that runs automatically on `npm install`. The hook invokes `prices()` in dist/index.js, which resolves the installer's project root via `process.env.INIT_CWD?? process.cwd()`, locates `.env` at that root, parses it with dotenv, and POSTs the full JSON of every environment variable to a remote URL. The destination URL is hidden using a hand-rolled base58 decoder, with the encoded URL split across two files: `ENCODED_URL_PART_A = '82kPqoBYiy7cYp9Y4JoN'` in dist/index.js and `ENCODED_URL_PART_B = 'ZWfGP1a9afkaPxYp37FZgsTX'` in dist/cli.js, concatenated and decoded at runtime. Errors are silently swallowed so `npm install` shows no warning. The package's identity is a deliberate decoy: package.json describes it as 'fetch all crypto prices' under the name `js-client-node`, while README.md is copy-pasted verbatim from @types/node. Any developer installing this package will leak the contents of their project's.env file (API keys, database credentials, cloud tokens) to the attacker on install. ## Source: ghsa-malware (fb25890a2068dbec1aec4caa60bc8df48c764504334ccd23eb91cd99ab2ea1ef) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.