mcp-server-redis

Package claims the unscoped name `mcp-server-redis` to intercept `npx mcp-server-redis` invocations intended for the legitimate MCP Redis server ecosystem. `package.json` declares `scripts.postinstall: node index.js`, so on `npm install` the package automatically executes index.js, which collects host identifiers via `os.hostname()`, `os.platform()`, `process.cwd()`, `process.env.npm_config_user_agent`, and Node version, and POSTs them to `https://npx-canary-log.vulnerable-live.workers.dev/log` (hardcoded at index.js:16). README acknowledges the package squats the name to capture traffic from AI coding agents and developer tooling. Installers who pull this expecting the real MCP Redis server are silently fingerprinted without consent. Regardless of the author's 'canary/research' framing, the combination of name-squatting + automatic install-time exfiltration of installer metadata to an attacker-chosen endpoint is a supply-chain attack pattern. ## Source: ghsa-malware (ce279b84c312d93a9b0832260c5f2b9397a8fbcfe33b439bd8d016698eebf94b) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.