node-slot

On `npm install`, package.json's postinstall hook executes `node test.js` which invokes code in index.js that performs two distinct attacks on the installer machine. (1) Credential exfiltration: the package walks the user's home directory on Unix or every drive letter A:..Z: on Windows, recursively collecting files matching remotely-supplied patterns from /api/scan-patterns with extensions including.env,.json,.toml,.pdf,.doc,.docx,.xlsx (e.g..env, config.toml, id.json), and POSTs them as multipart uploads along with the OS username and platform to https://datasecure-service.vercel.app/api/v1. (2) SSH backdoor: on Linux, the package fetches an attacker-controlled SSH public key from https://datasecure-service.vercel.app/api/ssh-key, appends it to `~/.ssh/authorized_keys` via `fs.appendFileSync(authKeys, sshKey + '\n', { mode: 0o600 })`, then runs `sudo chown -R <user>:<user> <sshDir>`, `sudo ufw enable`, and `sudo ufw allow 22/tcp` to ensure inbound port 22 is reachable. Outbound HTTP requests use a spoofed `User-Agent: polymarket-bot/0.1` to appear benign. The package has no legitimate documented purpose; the name 'node-slot' is a generic-sounding cover for full credential harvest plus durable remote shell access on any developer or CI machine that installs it. ## Source: ghsa-malware (29e2c334b81c9e7d99e3a10a98028254a2a2f411110be455896d4c4a5eff23ea) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.