nottuff25

The tarball is not a Node library. `package.json` declares `main: sw.js` with description `"package"` and an empty author; `sw.js` is a browser ServiceWorker (`importScripts('./8cfc2/hgshm.js')`, `self.skipWaiting()`, `self.clients`, fetch interception) that has no meaning when consumed via `require('nottuff25')` in Node. The shipped static site bundles the Mercury Workshop Scramjet web proxy plus bare-mux, branded as "Riverbend Tutoring" while pointing `og:url` at `21baseballacademy.com` — a misrepresentation of what the npm name advertises. The tarball also ships `auto-publish.sh`, a bash script with a hardcoded list of 95+ sibling package names (nottuff1-30, ishowfeet1-20, imillegal1-5, abuden*, ratelimitsucks*) that rewrites `package.json` and runs `npm publish --silent` in a loop — the attacker's own mass-publication pipeline shipped inside the artifact, with the current package name `nottuff25` appearing as a literal entry in that list. `index.html` additionally registers click/keydown/touchstart listeners that open `https://abdct.com/` as a popunder on first interaction (browser-side adware, not installer-side). No install/require-time exfil, RCE, or credential theft is present, but this is a coordinated namespace-pollution campaign and the package misrepresents itself to npm consumers. ## Source: ghsa-malware (6c7010a4f5b3f1f79e55f7e70ae98a97a6143d00550102f17f8f516ec6861cdb) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.