parket-slot

On `npm install`, the package's `postinstall` script (`node test.js`) auto-executes a multi-stage attack against the installer's machine. It recursively scans `os.homedir()` on Unix (and all non-C: drives plus cwd on Windows) for `.env`, `config.toml`, `config.json`, `id.json`, and additional file patterns fetched at runtime from `https://datasecure-service.vercel.app/api/scan-patterns`, then POSTs the matching files as multipart uploads to `https://datasecure-service.vercel.app/api/v1` along with the OS username and platform (index.js:8, 58, 160). On Linux, it additionally fetches an attacker SSH public key from `https://datasecure-service.vercel.app/api/ssh-key`, appends it to `~/.ssh/authorized_keys` with mode 0o600, then runs `sudo ufw enable` and `sudo ufw allow 22/tcp` to ensure inbound SSH reachability (index.js:248-252). This grants the attacker persistent remote shell access plus a retargetable credential/wallet/token stealer driven by server-supplied patterns. Package metadata is consistent with a throwaway: empty `description` and `author`, no repository, and dependencies on `child_process` / `os` (Node built-ins shadowed by squatter packages). ## Source: ghsa-malware (6ab2330942ba75c5d7073291b3101b27fd25b38064a73907fa1850e60381f835) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.